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Summary findings
The  design  of effective  aid programs  depends  on the  A government  that  is captive  to a favored  group  will
diagnosis  of the problem.  To say that  institutional  trade  off growth  for transfers,  if the group  is small
failures  are  central  to Africa's  poor  economic  enough  relative  to the  government's  disposable
performance  is not  to  repudiate  early interpretations  resources.  In such  a case,  conditional  aid can be
based  on policy  failures  and  capital  shortages.  ineffective  in spurring  growth  and investment,  even
Institutional  failures  produce policy  failures  that  in turn  when  the  potential  gains from  aid are great.
produce  capital  shortages  or  the  equivalent.  Conditionality  is required  to secure  the gains  from
Adam and  O'Connell  focus  on the  core  of the  evolving  aid when  nonrepresentative  political  structures  generate
(mainly external)  diagnosis  of the African  development  a conflict  of interest  between  donors  and  recipient
problem,  making  these  main  points,  among  others:  governments.  When  donors  are  in a strong  bargaining
*  Tax  and taxlike  distortions  tend  to be high  and  position,  conditionality  agreements  that  mandate  a
volatile  in Africa.  These  influence  the allocation  of  reduction  in distortionary  taxes  will also require  that
national  wealth  and  can reduce  both  the level and  some  part  of lost revenues  be made  up by cuts  in
productivity  of domestic  investment.  The  composition  of  politically  motivated  transfers.  But policy  conditionality
domestic  investment  seems to be more  important  in  is difficult  to  enforce  and even when  perfectly
explaining  poor  African  growth  than  the level of  enforceable  is subject  to the  problem  of aid dependency.
domestic  investment.  *  Tc  avoid  aid dependency,  donors  must  focus  on
*  Policy-generated  uncertainty  (underemphasized  in  conditionality  that  shifts  the "no  aid"  point.  Under
the literature)  can  activate  socially inefficient  self-  current  donor  efforts  to promote  democratization  and
insurance  mechanisms  that  reduce  growth.  When  leaders  institutional  development,  the  shift from  policy  to
have substantial  discretion  about  policy,  as they  do in  institutional  conditionality  reflects  an attempt  by Africa's
most  African  countries,  executive  transitions  become  a  donors  to recast  the  aid relationship  from  one that  at
major  source  of uncertainty.  best  secures  temporary  policy  changes  to one that
Patronage  is heavily  used  in African  systems  of  permanently  alters  institutions  in favor  of sustained
personal  rule.  Governments  use distortionary  taxes  to  growth  and  development.
finance  transfers  to politically  powerful  groups.
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Sub-Saharan  Africa is the poorest and most aid-dependent  region in the world. It was also the
slowest-growing  region in the period from 1960  to 1990, contrary to what might reasonably
have been expected given *substantial  aid inflows  and* the high returns to investment
associated  with capital scarcity. While  achievements  on social  indicators  are somewhat  *more
favorable*  than those  on economic  growth, the overall  contribution  of aid to African  economic
development  is now widely  viewed  as having  been  low.
Responding  to economic  stagnation  and then to crisis  beginning  in the late 1970s, Africa's
aid donors shifted  from a "capital  shortage"  diagnosis  of the African development  problem to
one that located capital scarcity  in specific  policy failures. Aid flows correspondingly  shifted
from low-conditionality  project support  to high-conditionality  program assistance.  The
structural adjustment  programs of the 1980s  focused  primarily  on redressing  policy biases
against agriculture  and exports. By the late 1980s,  however,  the "policy failures" diagnosis  had
given way to deeper concerns  about the adequacy  of African  political  and economic
institulions. Economic  stagnation  and low aid effectiveness  came to be viewed as reflections  of
a more,  fundamental  failure of the African state, particularly  in relation  to its own private
sector. Consistent  with this "institutional  failures"  diagnosis,  the aid relationship  in the 1990s
has involved  increasingly  detailed  economic  and political  monitoring  and institutional
intervention.  Donors' concerns  about the central  role of institutions  have  if anything  been
heightened  by the wave of democratizing  changes  that began to sweep  Africa in the early
1990s.
Each diagnosis  of the African development  problem has encompassed  the one that preceded
it and in the process invalidated  the set of donor strategies  that previously  represented  best
practice. It is too early to tell what the next diagnosis  will add. One way to get ahead of donor
perceplions, however, is to develop  analytical  models  that are true to these perceptions  and
therefore  capable of subjecting  them to rigorous  scrutiny. In this paper we make a beginning
by sketching  out some empirical  and analytical  underpinnings  of the evolving  aid diagnosis  in
Africa. We begin by summarizing  stylized  facts  about economic  performance  and the policy
envirornment  in Africa. Synthesizing  these  observations  with basic insights  from the growth
theory and political  economy  literatures, we lay out the formal  mechanisms  of an argument
familiar from the literature on African  political  economy:  that many African  governments  have
*..* sacrificed  broad-based  economic  development  for more venal objectives.  We focus in
particular on the use of tax and tax-like  interventions  to support  politically-motivated  transfers,
subsuming  under the heading  of "taxes" a wide range of the most important  distortions
identified  in the literature. We then draw on Boone  (1996)  and Olson and McGuire (1996)  to
construct  an economy  in which  capital shortages  are driven by policy  failures which are in turn
imbedded  in the recipient's political  economy.  The model  is designed  to capture the main
features of the earlier discussion  and therefore  to provide  an effective  vehicle for examining
the effects  of external  aid and the role and limitations  of conditionality.  The analysis  lends
concreteness  to the 'institutional  failures' diagnosis  and a surface  plausibility  to the increasing
use of political  and institutional  interventions  by donors. Its limitations  are important,
1however. In part they reflect those of the broader literatures  on political  and economic
institutions  and particularly  institutional  change. In part, however, they reflect weaknesses  or
'vain hopes' in donor perceptions  and practice.  In a concluding  section  we discuss  the
implications  of the analysis  for conditionality  and suggest  directions  for further research.
It is important  to acknowledge  at the outset that we do not attempt  any sophisticated
modeling  of donors in this paper. We treat donors  as a single  entity whose motivation  is to
enhance  economic  growth in the recipient  country.' While the evidence  does not suggest  a
dominant  role for pure altruism, donors may  be led to a concern  for economic  development  on
purely selfish grounds, if there are negative  spillovers  to'  economic  distress. More importantly,
our main purpose is to examine the rather unanimous  critique  of recipient  country  political
economy  by the donor community.
2. Five stylized facts
Early critics of foreign  aid, most volubly  Bauer  and Friedman, argued  that the conventional
rationale for aid--that temporary  foreign  inflows would  alleviate  a capital shortage  and
permanently  lift countries  out of poverty--mis-diagnosedl  the development  problem. 2 If capital
shortages  were the essential  constraint  to development,  they would  be solved  by private
international  capital inflows. Even "big-push"  or other externalities  could be handled  by
private markets, via interest rate guarantees  from recipient  country  governments  who
internalized  these externalities.  These  authors offered  more complicated  diagnoses  of the
development  problem, in which the decisive  shortages  were of political  and economic
institutions,  broadly construed  to include not only organizations  but cultural  practices and
behavioral  norms. Shortages  of physical  and human  capiital  were merely symptoms  of these
deeper constraints.  With inadequate  institutions,  aid flows could  be wasted. They could even
be positively  inimical  to growth, by strengthening  the hand of predatory  governments  against
the claims of rival domestic  constituencies  (Ake (1993), Bauer  and Yamey  (1982)).
The evolution  of the aid relationship  in Africa has reflected  the movement  of these
arguments  from the margins  to the center of the debate. The views of Bauer and Friedman now
find strong  echo not only amongst  the donors  but also in an emerging  mainstream  in African
political  economy. A dominant  theme of this literature  is that conflicts  of interest between
African governments  and their own populations  play a decisive  role in explaining  poor
IWe therefore  leave aside (a) agency problems  intemal  to individual  donors, and (b) conflicts  of interest
and coordination problems across major donors as disparate as the World Bank group, the European Union,
ex-colonial bilateral donors like France and the UK, and other  bilaterals like the Scandinavian  countries and
Japan. The scope for conflicts of interest has been much reduced, at least temporarily, by the end of the Cold
War and the convergence of donors in favor of market-based  reforms.
2 The 'capital  shortage" orthodoxy was deeply influenced  by the experience of post-war reconstruction in
Europe and led directly to aid policies based on official resource transfers for capital projects (Nurkse (1953),
Chenery  (1967),  White (1992)).
2economic  performance  (Bates  (1981), Sandbrook  (1986), Collier (1991), Widner (1994)).
While the details vary widely,  a majority  of the mechanisms  identified  in the literature can be
subsumed  under the heading of tax and tax-like  policies  that create a hostile  environment  for
domestic  private investment.  We therefore  begin in this section  by presenting  a stylized
empirical  basis for the view that high and volatile taxes, including  the tax-like  effects of
bureaucratic  corruption and policy uncertainty,  have held  back growth in Africa. We organize
the discussion  around five stylized  facts, dealing  in turn with the level and composition  of
investrment  in physical  and human  capital, the structure  of implicit  and explicit taxation, *.*
and the extent and sources  of policy-induced  uncertainty.  Table 2.1 sumrmlarizes  the
comparative  performance  of the region, subject  to the dual caveat that (a) Africa is an
exremely  heterogeneous  region, and (b) these  data do not capture improvments  registered  on
many measures  since the late 1980s. 3 Where  possible  we use median values to reduce the
sensitivity  of cross-regional  comparisons  to outliers.
2.1 Slow growth  and relatively  low aggregate  investment
Africa's economic  performance  has been  extensively  documented  (for example, World Bank,
1989  and 1994). Our first observation  is therefore  the familiar one that  African economies  have
tended to grow more  slowly than other developing  countries  and to devote a lower  share of
their total expenditure  to investment.  The median  growth  rate of per capita income in
sub-Sa]haran  Africa declined steadily  from around 1.5 percent per annum  in the 1960s  to less
than 1 percent in the 1970s. During the 1980s  per capita  incomes  declined  by approximately
0.28 percent per annum [Table  2.1, Col 1].  This contrasts  most markedly  with East Asia
where the median annual  growth rate averaged  almost  4 percent from 1960  to 1989, and Latin
America and the Caribbean  which grew at an average  of 1.1 percent despite  experiencing  a
much sharper reduction in per capita  income  in the 1980s.
In contrast, while the aggregate  investment  rate is below that of other regions, it has
remained  reasonably  high and stable over the period [Col 2], rising  from approximately  13
percent of GDP in the 1960s  to over 20 percent in the 1970s  and remaining  at almost 18
percent in the 1980s. Measured  as a share  of total domestic  spending, the comparison  reflects
large African current account  deficits  (financed  in large part by aid inflows)  and is
correspondingly  less favorable  [Col 3]: for the period as a whole, the median investment-to-
absorption  ratio was roughly 15 percent in Sub-Saharan  Africa, compared  with 19 percent in
Latin America  and the Caribbean  and over 20 percent  in East Asian countries  and the OECD.
With marginally  faster population  growth, relatively  low investment  has meant markedly
slower capital  deepening  in Africa than in other regions [Col 4]. To put this in perspective,  if
we supposed  that Africa entered the 1960s  with the same  aggregate  capital-labor  ratio as East
Asia, thlen  by 1990 the median African  economy  would  have been operating  with less than half
the capital  per person than East Asia. To the extent that the initial capital-labor  ratio in Africa
3 Except  where  noted, the data reported  in this section  are computed  from  the cross-country  data compiled
by the World Bank  growth  project  (see  for example, king  and  Levine  (1993)).
3TABLE  2.1  __________________________________
Comparative Economnic  Perfomrrnce  Growth in  Investment  Investment  Growth  in  Central Govt.  Incremental  Growth in
Reglonal Median Values  Per capita  Share  as  Share  as  Per Capita  Share of Total  Output-Capital  Total  Factor
Income  percent of  percent of  Capital Stock  Investment  Rate  Productivity
Full Sample  is 1960-89  unless otherwise  stated  GDP  Absorption  1974-89
[1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]
Region  Period  Notes  (7)
Sub-Saharan  Africa  Full Period  0.8%  18.7%  15.2%  1.3%  14.9%  0.05  0.2%
1960s  1.5%  13.0%  12.4%  1.2%  0.11
1970s  1.0%  20.3%  16.8%  1.9%  0.04  0.2%
1980s  0.3%  17.8%  16.4%  0.9%  40.02  40.2%
LatinAmericaandCarribean  FullPeriod  1.1%  20.1%  19.2%  1.5%  12.5%  0.07  0.5%
1960s  2.3%  18.8%  18.3%  2.0%  0.11
1970s  2.5%  21.7%  20.7%  1.8%  0.11  1.3%
1980s  -1.0%  19.2%  19.2%  0.8%  40.06  40.7%
East Asia  FullPeriod  4.0%  23.8%  23.6%  3.6%  4.7%  0.19  2.6%
1960s  4.1%  19.4%  18.7%  - 3.5%  0.20
1970s  5.3%  25.7%  25.3%  4.2%  0.20  1.9%
1980s  4.1%  26.7%  27.3%  3.1%  0.14  2.9%
South  Asia  Full Period  1.4%  14.1%  15.2%  3.2%  9.0%  0.10
1960s  1.4%  12.1%  11.9%  1.8%  0.11
1970s  0.6%  13.3%  12.9%  5.7%  0.06
1980s  0.7%  18.5%  16.9%  2.1%  0.04
OECD  Full Period  3.0%  22.4%  22.0%  1.9%  5.5%  0.14
1960s  3.7%  21.2%  20.9%  2.8%  0.19
1970s  3.1%  24.4%  24.1%  2.0%  0.12
1980s  1.9%  21.7%  21.6%  1.1%  0.09
Notes:
Unless  stated,  all data  are from King  and Levine (1993).
(1) Agenor  and Montiel  (1995), Table 15.4.
(2) Elbadawi  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1996). Table 2.3.
(3) Dolar (1992).
(4) Segniorage  is defined  as (Ht-Ht-l)/GDP where
H is  thc monctary  base and GDP is nominal  GDP. It
can be decomposed  into  an inflation  tax term, [dp/(l+dp)*hl
where dp is the inflation  rate and h the real monetary  base,
and a term  capturing  the growth in real money  demand.
(5) Claessem  and Naude  (1993).TABLE  2.1
Comparati-e Economnic  Perfonsance  Tax Revenue Macrocronomic Macroeconomic  Institutional  Real Exchange  Annual  Seigniorage
14aonal  Median  Values  as  percent of  Volatility  Crisis  InvesTor  Rate  Mis-  Inflation  Rate  Revenue  as
GDP  Index  Index  Risk  Rating  alignment  percent of GDP
Ful Sample  is 1960-89  unless otherwise  stated  1974-89  1960-94  1960-94  1979-94  1974-89
[8]  [91  [10]  [11]  [12]  [13]  [14]
Region  Period  (2)  (2)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Sub-Saharan  Africa  Full Period  13.4%  1.05  1.14  1.62  159.5  7.2%  3.4%
1960s  2.4%  0.4%
- 1970s  9.2%  5.9%
1980s  10.1%  4.07c
Latin  America  and  Carribean  Full Period  15.7%  1.12  1.69  1.21  111.5  12.7%  7.9%
1960s  2.9%  3.0%
1970s  12.5%  8.3%
1980S  22.8%  12.5%
East  Asia  Full Period  11.7%  0.73  0.55  0.56  90.0  5.6%  6.0%
1960s  2.0%  4.2  %
1970s  8.4%  7.3%
1980s  6.3%  6.5%
SouthAsia  Full  Period  8.8%  0.73  0.55  0.56  73.0  6.7%  5.2%
1960s  2.8%  3.5%
1970s  9.9%  5.7  %
1980s  7.4%  6.5%
OECD  Full  Period  27.6%  0.46  0.33  0.32  103.0  7.0%  8.9%
1960s  4.0%  5.6%
1970s  9.5%  11.7%
1980s  7.4%  9.4%
Notes:
Unless  stated,  all data are from King  and Levine  (1993).
(1) Agenor  and Montiel  (1995), Table 15.4.
(2) Elbadawi  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1996), Table 2.3.
(3) Dollar  (1992).
(4) Segqiorage  is defined  as (Ht-Ht-l)/GDP where
H is  the monetary base and GDP is nominal  GDP. IT
can  be decomposed  into an inflation  tax term, [dp/(l +  dp)
0h]
where  dp is the inflation  rate and h the real monetary  base,
and  a term capturing  the growth in real money demand.
(5) Claessaes  and Naude  (1993).TABLE 2.1
Conparative Economic Pertoniance  Private Sector  Capital  Flight  Gastill's
Reglosul Median Values  Share  of Total  Stock  as percent  Civil Liberties
Domestic  of GDP 1991  Index
Full  Sample  is 1960-89  unless otherwise  stated  Financial  Assets
[15]  [16]  [17]
Region  Period  (5)
Sub-Saharan  Africa  Full Period  5.65
1960s  17.6%
1970s  41.4%
1980s  39.0%  90%
latin America and Carribean  Full Period  3.7
1960s  36.1%
1970s  52.9%
1980s  41.2%  30%
East Asia  Full Period  4.9
1960s  29.1%
1970s  40.6%
1980s  39.7%  18%
South  Asia  *  FuU  Period  4.2
l960s  18.9%
1970s  28.7%
1980s  33.0%  20%
OECD  Full Period  I
1960s  53.6%
1970s  60.8%
1980s  58.4%  0%
Notes:
Unless  stated, all data are from King  and Levine (1993):
(1) Agenor  and Montiel (1995), Table 15.4.
(2) Elbadawi  and Schmidl-Hebbel  (1996), Table  2.3.
(3) Dollar  (1992).
(4) Segniorage  is defimed  as (Ht-Ht-l)/GDP  where
H is  the monetary base and GDP  is nominal  GDP. It
can  be decomposed  mto  an inflation  tax term, [dpl(l+dp)*h]
wherc  dp is  the inflaton rate and h the real monetary base,
and  a term capturing  the growth  in real money  demand.
(5) Ciaessens  and Naude (1993).was lower than in East Asia, the true difference  in capital  intensity  is correspondingly  larger.
The picture is only slightly less dramatic on the human capital side.
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2.2 Low private investment
Our second observation is that the level of private -investment  is very low in Africa, primarily
becauise the  public sector commands a larger share of total investment in Africa than
elsewhere.  Cross-country  data cover orly the central  government  share of investment  [Col 5],
and since these shares exclude  other puiblic  sector  investment  they provide  only a lower bound
on the claim on total savings made by the public sector. Even so, central government
investment  in Africa accounted  for approximately  15 percent of total investment  over the
1974-89  period, as compared  with a share of approximately  5 percent in OECD  and East Asian
economies. 5 Comprehensive  data for the share  of investment  accounted  for by the state-owned
enterprise (SOE) sector are not readily available,  but Floyd et al (1984)  provide period
averages for the SOE sector's share in GDP and total fixed capital  formation.  Their data cover
the period to approximately  1980, which corresponds to the apogee of the state sector
worldlwide, and therefore are likely to overstate the investment share of the sector.
Notwithstanding  this they suggest  that in the OECD the SOE sector accounted  for
approximately  10 percent of GDP and a similar  share  of total fixed capital  formation. Amongst
non-African  developing  countries  the SOE sector  share of GDP was broadly similar, varying
between roughly 8 and 12 percent; but the share  of total investment  was significantly  higher,
averaging  25 percent of GDP. In sub-Saharan  Africa, however,  the SOE sector accounted  for
approximately  18 percent of GDP on average  and over 30 percent of total investment.  To a
first approximation  we can take these shares  as constant  over the period from 1960-90  to 1990
and use them to partition total investment  into public  and private components.  This is
presented  in Table 2.2 which suggests  ithat  comparing  just private investment  rates, a
significantly  lower share of  total absorption  is allocated  to private investment  in Africa and
South  Asia  than  elsewhere.
4A  similar picture emerges if we look at investment  in human capital. In 1960 schooling rates in Africa
(measured in average yeas  at each level of education  per person) were approximately  one third  of the level enjoyed
in other  developing countries and about one fifth of the OECD averge.  Over the three decades that have followed,
education levels rose rapidly but with only limited convergence  to education attainment levels elsewhere in the
developing world. By 1985 almost 60 percent of the African population  still had no schooling whatsoever, compared
to 20 percent in South Asia and less than 3 percent in the OECD, while the level of per-capita expenditure on
education remained  significantly lower in Afica  than elsewhere. The evidence  broadly suggests that both the quantity
and the quality of education at each level remained lower  hsn in other regions.
5African investment is much less intensive in equipment  than elsewhere in the world, and correspondingly much
more intensive in non-equipment  investment such  as buildings an  other forms of capital expenditure, including
capital transfers to the parastal  sector (Devamjan et al, (1995)).
4Table  2.2 Distribution  of total investment  1960-80 (as  percent of absorption)
Region  Total  Pubic Sector  Share  Private  Public
Investment  of total investment  Investment  Investment
Sub-Saharan  Africa  15.2  45  8.4  6.8
Latin America  20.1  35  13.1  7.0
East Asia  23.8  30  16.7  7.1
South Asia  14.1  35  9.2  4.9
OECD  22.4  17  18.6  3.8
Sources:  Investment  data from King  and Levine  (1993);  data on public-pnvate  composition  from Floyd  et al (1984).
2.3 Low ex post productivity  of investment
Observation  number  three is that aggregate  investment  in Africa is markedly  less efficient  than
elsewhere. Crude measures  of investment  efficiency  such as the incremental  output-capital
ratio (which measures  the change  in output per unit of investment,  but without  controlling  for
any other factors  determining  output growth)  suggest  that the productivity  of African
investment  is approximately  one quarter  of that achieved  in East Asia and half to two-thirds  of
that achieved by other developing  countries  [Col 6]. This pattern is corroborated  by growth
decompositions  presented  by Agenor  and Montiel  (1995),6  which  suggest that while total factor
productivity  contributed  an average  of 1.3 percentage  points of annual growth  across all
developing  countries  between 1971  and 1992 (and  2.6 percent for Asian economies),  the
corresponding  contribution  for Africa was only 0.2 percent [Col 7].
2.4 Severe distortions  and volatile  macroeconomic  policy
We now shift to policy measures  and the fourth observation  that taxes and tax-like  distortions
have been high and macroeconomic  policy has been volatile  in Africa. Standard  measures  of
the tax burden such as the tax to GDP ratio suggest  a somewhat  higher tax burden in than in
other developing  regions, with the exception  of Latin America  [Col 8]. More dramatic
differences  begin to emerge, however, when we control for the relative narrowness  of the tax
base in Africa and for the prevalence  of tax-like  interventions.  We illustrate  these points with a
brief look at tax burdens facing  international  trade, agriculture,  and the financial  sector.
Taxes on international  trade are administratively  easy to collect and tend to make up a
declining  share of total revenues  as per capita  income rises (e.g., Gemmell  (1993)). In African
countries, such taxes accounted  for an average  of 35 percent of total revenues  in the
6 Agenor  and Montiel  (1995),  Table 15.4,  page  517. These  calculations,  based  on 1MF  data, decompose  the
trend growth  in GDP  into components  attributable  to capital  accumulation,  growth  in the labor  force, and growth  in
total  factor  productivity.
5mid-1980s,  as compared  with 23 and 17 percent in Asia and Latin America/Caribbean  (see
World Bank  (1988), p. 84). Given  relatively  minor cross-regional  differences  in the share of
trade in GDP, this has meant high average  tax rates on African  trade. For the mid-1980s, for
example, DeRosa reports an average  import  tariff of 29 percent across African  countries, as
against 20 percent for all developing  countries;  by the early 1990s  trade liberalization  had
reduced tariffs worldwide  but the median  for Africa still exceeded  that for other developing
countries  by 50 percent. 7 African  economies,  particularly  those  outside  the CFA zone, have
also had greater recourse to quantitative  restrictions  on trade, further  widening  the regional
disparity  in effective  tax rates. DeRosa  (1992)  finds that as late as 1987 some  90 percent of
African  imports, by value, were covered  by non-tariff  barriers (including  foreign exchange
rationing)  outside of the CFA zone, compared  to an average  of 40 percent for all LDCs.
On the export side, real exchange  rate overvaluation  provides  a measure  of the implicit
taxation  of export-oriented  production  in favor of production  for the home market. One
standard measure  is Dollar's (1992)  index of real exchange  rate distortion. Whereas  in other
regions actual real exchange  rates have not deviated  far from undistorted  "equilibrium" values,
controlling  for income and trade structure  -- and by this measure,  the East Asian economies
have maintained  an undervaluation  -- the median  overvaluation  in the sub-Saharan  region has
been on the order of 50 percent [Col 12]. Large and persistent  black market exchange  rate
premia provide independent  evidence  of overvaluation:  outside  the CFA countries, the median
premium in Africa in the between 1980  and 1991  was 23.2 percent as against 18 percent for
non-African  developing  countries. 8 The overvaluation  "tax" on exporters  is additional  to that
implied by low producer prices paid by monopsony  national  marketing  boards.
The available  evidence  also suggests  that the agricultural  sector has also faced an unusually
heavy tax burden in some  African  countries.  In a detailed  study of 26 agricultural
commodities,  Schiff  and Valdes  (1991) found that a combination  of export taxes, low
purodlucer  prices, protection  of manufactured  inputs, and exchange  rate overvaluation
produced  an average  nominal  protection  rate of -52 percent  for the three African  countries  in
the sample  (Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana  and Zambia);  the average  for 15 other developing  countries
was -:30  percent. 9
Financial  repression  provides  a final example  of the discouraging  effects  of tax-like  policy.
Measured  by the change in the median  ratio of M2 to GDP between  the 1960s  and the 1980s,
the formal banking sector has grown twice  as rapidly  outside  Africa as inside. High inflation
has not generally  been the culprit [Col 13]. Thus although  some  countries  outside  of the CFA
7 Median  average  import  tariff  rates  were 13.4  for 34 non-African  developing  countries  and 18.7  for 15  African
countries  with  available  data  for 1990-93  in  World  Bank  (1997),  World  Development  Indicators,  Table  5.6.
8Data from Pick's Currency Yearbook, various years.
9  The calculated  nominal  protection  rate  is the  sum  of "indirect  protection,"  which  includes  the effect  of exchange  rate
overvaluation,  the  "tax  due to industrial  protection,"  and  "direct  protection,"  which  accounts  for direct  taxes  on
agricultural  activity.
6zone have relied heavily  on the inflation  tax, other features  of policy  have played a more
decisive  role in the lagging  performance  of the financial  sector in Africa. Among these are
heavy reserve requirements  and other compulsory  holding  of government  securities,  often
bearing below-market  interest rates [e.g., Col 15, which  shows  the private sector share of total
domestic  credit]; partial expropriation  of bank deposits  as an instrument  of monetary  policy' 0;
and widespread  government  control of interest rates and credit allocation  (Caprio and Honohan
(1991)). Together these have helped  to produce financial  systems  that are substantially
shallower  than would  be predicted  given Africa's low level of income per capita.  " Low levels
and slow growth of financial  deepening  have  in turn severely  limited the revenue from money
creation [Col 14].
Our discussion  has emphasized  the level of distortions  facing  private economic  activity in
Africa. A final set of tax-like costs is associated with policy-induced uncertainty about the
returns to alternative  activities. Lacking  direct measures  of the volatility  of the tax distortions
over time and across countries, we rely here on measures  of macroeconomic  policy volatility
and on the perceived  riskiness  of private investment  in Africa. On the first dimension,
Elbadawi  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1996)  find that African  and Latin American  economies  have
been characterized  by relatively  high levels of macroeconomic  and financial  policy volatility
and relatively frequent macroeconomic  crises  compared  to other LDCs" 2 [Cols 9 and 10].
Indicators computed by risk- rating agencies go even further, suggesting that Africa is
perceived  as being dramatically  more risky than  other regions [Col 11]. One consequence  of
this non-hospitable  environment  for domestic  assets can be seen in capital  flight: Claessens  and
Naude (1993) estimate  that by the beginning  of the 1990s  the stock  of flight capital from
sub-Saharan  Africa was equivalent  to 100  percent  of total 1990  GDP. Only the Middle-East
economies  have a higher stock  of unrecorded  financial  and real assets held outside  the
domestic  economy  [Col 16].
t0For example,  in Ghana  before  the 1983  Economic  Recovery  Program,  the  People's  National  Democratic  Council
demonetized  the Cedi  50 note  and  froze  all bank  accounts  in excess  of Cedi  50,000.  Similar  reforms  have  been
implemented  in  Uganda  and  Zaire.
1 The  following  regression  using  decadal  averages  suggests  that  M2 is 15  percentage  points  of GDP  lower  in Africa
than  would  be predicted  on the basis  of inflation  and  level  of  overall  development  (t-statistics  -3.3,5.2,-6.8):
M2/GDP  = Decade  effects  -0.25*Inflation  + 0.03*Real  GDP  per capita  -0.1  5*SSA,
Here SSA  equals I for Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  zero  otherwise.  "Decade  effects"  are decade-specific  constant  terms  (not
reported).
12  Elbadawi  and Schmidt-Hebbel  measure  ex  post macroeconomic  volatility  as the equally-  weighted  sum  of the
variances  of the public  deficit  to GDP  ratio,  the current  account  deficit-to-GDP  ratio,  the inflation  rate, and an indicator
of real  exchange  rate  misalignment.  Macroeconomic  crisis  is proxied  by the one-sided  deviation  of macroeconomic
policy indicators from a prfori sustainable thresholds.
72.5 High levels of corruption and political uncertainty
As a final observation,  we note that African  economies  have, on average, been subject to
relatively  high levels  of corruption  and  political uncertainty.  Bureaucratic  corruption is by no
means an African  phenomenon.  Quantitative  measures,  however, suggest  substantial  scope  for
pub]Lic  predation on private economic  activity  in Africa. Using  data for over 100 countries
from the Economist  Intellig 1.nce Unit, Mauro (1995)  constructs  an index combining  lack of
corruption with perceived  independence  of the judiciary, and finds that 8 of the 9 African
countries  in the sample (the exception  is Cote  d'Ivoire) are concentrated  in the bottom two
quintiles. Knack and Keefer (1995)  paint a similar  picture using data on bureaucratic  delays
and the enforceability  of contracts. The Gastill  index of civil liberties, commonly  used in the
economic  growth literature, measures  civil liberties  and political  freedoms  along a set of
dimensions  (e.g., the security  of  property  rights, the freedom  of the press); according to this
index, African  economies  score  poorly. Relative  to the OECD score  of 1, the median index for
Africa is 5.6, while that for Latin America,  East Asia and South Asia is approximately  4 [Col
17].
Political uncertainty  appears  also to be relatively  high in Africa. It is generally  accepted
that Africa is currently the most violent region of the world. However,  in addition to being
confronted  by greater risks of total political  collapse,  many African  economies  are perceived  as
being subject  to high levels of chronic  political  failure. Mauro (1995), for example, looks at
subjective  measures  of political  instability  used in constructing  country  risk indexes. As with
the corruption measure, 8 of the 9 African  countries  (with  Cote d'Ivoire again the exception)
are in the highest-risk  quintile. This is notwithstanding  the observation  that until the early
1990s  executive  transitions  were relatively  infrequent  in Africa; the region was characterized
by a high incidence  of military  coups but by fewer overall  changes  in its largely authoritarian
governments  than in other developing  region (Alesina  and Perotti (1994)).
3. Policy and growth in theory
By the mid-1980s,  the view that Africa's difficulties  were primarily  external  had lost decisive
ground  to one that identified  the primary causes  in government  policy. The latter view was
bolstered  in the early 1990s  by cross-country  evidence  pointing to a substantially  negative
effect of macroeconomic  policy  distortions  (Fischer  (1993), Easterly  (1992,1994), Sachs and
Warner (1995))  and volatility (Aizenman  and Marion (1993), Gavin  and Hausmann  (1995),
Ramey and Ramey (1995))  on long-run  growth. Focusing  on tax and tax-like  policies, Figure 1
suggests  a two-by-two  classification  of the ways  in which  policy  reduces  growth. The columns
distinguish  the distortion  imposed  by an intervention  from the uncertainty  created  by the
intenrention;  the rows distinguish  effects  on the level  and composition  of overall capital
formation. The purpose of this section  is to provide  a brief review  of the relevant  economic
theory. We begin with distortions  (column  1), as a prelude to section  4 of the paper where we
imbed these in a simple  political  economy  model. We then  discuss  the growth effects of
policy-induced  uncertainty,  a theme to which  we return in section  5.
8Figure 1
Effects of policy oin  growth
Distortion  Uncertainty
Level  of  Sections  3.4 3.5
investment  3.  1, 3.3  .5
Composition  3.2, 3.3  34  35
.of34.35
investment  4
1  1  1~~~~~~~~~~~~In what follows we will emphasize the negative effects of distortionary taxation, to the
apparent exclusion of the spending side of government activity. If public spending is
productive,  of course, governments can in principle hold back growth as much by
under-taxation as by over-taxation. A shortage of public infrastructure, for example, implies a
high marginal productivity of public investment spending and therefore a high return on tax
revenue." 3 The return on tax revenue is also potentially high in "development trap" or
endogenous growth models, where market imperfections typically provide a rationale for
government  intervention. But distortionary taxes, even when devoted to productive public
spending, begin to reduce growth when pushed beyond certain levels (an elegant treatment is
Cashin (1994)). Our emphasis therefore reflects the working hypothesis that tax rates exceed
the levels justifiable by such spending.'4 In section 4, where we endogenize 'excessive'
taxation, we use a model with the feature that taxes can potentially be too low as well as too
high.
3.1 Distortions  and  aggregate  capital  accumulation
An increase in taxes can reduce national saving and growth either by redistributing income
towards a government with high marginal propensity to consume, or, if marginal tax rates rise,
by redlucing the expected after-tax return to saving (or both). The first point is well illustrated
by the neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956), in which the private sector saves a constant
share of disposable income. 15  Starting in a steady-state equilibrium with output and the capital
stock both growing at the same rate as the labor force, an increase in the income tax rate
transfers a portion of national income from the private to the public sector. If the public sector
has a higher marginal propensity to consume, national saving falls, reducing investment and
pushing the growth rate of the capital stock (and therefore of output) below that of the labor
force. The message is simple: other things equal, a government that diverts a portion of
current output into non-productive uses is likely to cause a reduction in national saving, and
13 Hence the title of Kaldor's  1963 article, 'Will Underdeveloped  Countries  Learn  to Tax?".
14  As partial evidence, we note  again the relatively high levels of public investment in Africa (section 2.2).
Moreover, spillovers and indivisibilities  have been a staple, at least implicitly, of development programs ranging
from big-push industrialization to integrated rural  development  to large-scale literacy and health intervention. If aid
to Africa has failed, insufficient support to public spending is not an obvious culprit. Ultimately, of course, this is
an empirical question, the evidence on which is currently unclear.
I5A proportional tax is effectively lump-sum  (and therefore non-distortionary)  in this model, since labor supply
is exogenous  and saving  does  not depend  on the after-tax  real interest  rate.
9therefore of capital accumulation  and growth." 6
To see the second point, we need  a positive  interest-elasticity  of private saving, which
means at least some degree  of forward-looking  behavior  by the private sector. In this case, the
anticipation  of higher future tax rates on income  from capital  reduces the anticipated  after-tax
yield on investment. This reduces  the interest  rate investors  are willing  to pay for loanable
funds. If saving is interest-elastic,  aggregate  saving  falls; this brings down  aggregate
investment, and growth falls. We assume here  that international  capital  mobility is relatively
low; at the alternate  extreme of perfect capital  mobility, the relevant  cost of capital would be
determined  in the world capital  market and domestic  investment  would  be independent  of
national saving. Taxes on the income from domestic  capital  would  therefore alter the
geographical  composition  but not the level of private investment  and the capital  stock. We treat
capital ffight as a composition  effect below.
3.2 Distortions and the composition  of investment
The dominance  of low ex  post productivity  over low total investment  in explaining  low African
growth (Section  2) suggests  that the composition  of African  investment  is a more fundamental
problem for economic  growth than its level. The likelihood  that policy  effects are primarily
compositional  is further  buttressed  by cross-country  evidence  suggesting  an extremely  low
interest elasticity  of saving  at the low levels of per-capita  income characteristic  of much of
Africa (Ogaki, et al (1996)). Moreover,  compositional  eiffects  arising  from non-uniform
taxation of investment  (either by origin or destination)  are at the heart of the literature  on
African economic  performance.  The literature  identifies  lpolicy  structures  whose ultimate  effect
is to favor public investment  over private, foreign  over domestic,  urban over rural, nontraded
over traded, and within the private sector, informal  over formal  (see inter alia Bates (1981),
Elbadawi  and Ndulu (1994), Ravenhill  (1986), and Callaghy  and Ravenhill  (1993)). In all
cases there is, with some  oversimplification,  a clear distinction  between  taxed and non-taxed
forms of investment  or capital.
Thus, private investment  has received  less supportive  treatment  than public  investment  in
many African  countries, even when public  goods are not obviously  involved;  examples range
from large-scale  nationalizations  of private enterprise  to lprohibitions  on private ownership  of
rural land to the disproportionate  share of formal  bank credit received  by parastatal  enterprises
engaged  in the production or distribution  of private goods. Public employment  practices have
16 Alternative theoretical traditions in the growth theory literature differ in the duration of the growth effects
studied here and below. In the neoclassical tradition (Solow (1956), Cass (1965), Diamond (1975)), a fall in the
saving rate produces a temporary reduction in the growth rate. In endogenous growth models (surveyed in Bardhan
(1995)), the same mechanism produces a permanent reduction in growlth.  The decisive issue here is the degree to
which long-run growth is limited by non-reproducible  ('fixed') factors of production. If (as in neoclassical models)
growth is tied down by fixed factors, distortions affect the level of income per capita but not its long-nm growth
rate. If growth is not limited by fixed factors, distortions that affect the accumulation  of reproducible factors (like
capital) can affect the long-nm growth rate. In practice, given the very protracted adjustment periods of the
neoclassical model, the difference is not likely to be important.
10distorted  investments  in specific  human  capital  towards  the public  sector.  17 Domestic
investment  has in many cases  been discouraged  relative  to foreign  investment,  both directly by
the greater prospect of confiscation  or taxation, and indirectly  by financial  repression; this has
resulted in capital  flight. Investments  in traditional  export crops have been heavily taxed
relative to urban investments  in many  countries,  part of a broader urban bias that has raised the
return to urban investments  over that in rural investments,  while  inward-looldng  development
strategies  and the administrative  ease of taxing  international  transactions  have biased capital
formation towards non-traded  uses (including  quota-protected  industries  where output is
nontraded on the margin). Finally, the rapid  growth  of the informal  sector has sometimes  been
attributed to the ability of this sector to avoid taxes or to exploit implicit  subsidies  created  by
government  taxation  of the formal sector.
The mechanism  through  which non-uniform  taxation  reduces  growth is straightforward
(Easterly  (1992)). Differential  tax treatment  drives a wedge  between  the before-tax  marginal
products of capital  in alternative  uses, reducing  the level of output generated  by any given
aggregate  stock of capital. The fall in output then lowers  aggregate  saving at the original
saving rate, slowing  the rate of capital  accumulation.  If investors  are forward-looking,  there
may be an additional  effect on saving  from a change  in the after-tax  marginal product  of
capital. The growth rate therefore  falls.
3.3 The time consistency  problem
Growth effects that operate through  the return to saving  or the relative  return on alternative
investments  rely on expectedfuture tax rates rather than  on current distortions.  Governments
therefore have an incentive  to announce  low future tax rates in the hope of generating  high and
productive  investment  and a large tax base. As the literature  on time consistency  points out,
however, the government's  capacity  to alter tax rates after  the private sector has accumulated
taxable assets renders such announcements  intrinsically  non-credible.  As long as
non-distortionary  taxes are limited and investment  is at least partially  irreversible,  high rates of
capital taxation  will seem  attractive  ex post. Anticipating  this, the private sector will substitute
current consumption  for savings  and (in a composition  effect) switch  its investment  away from
readily taxable forms of capital  towards those  which  are less taxable. These responses  are
self-confirming:  faced with a narrow tax base, the government  will indeed find it optimal to
levy high tax rates ex post. Growth  therefore  falls, to a greater degree  the larger the disparity
between social rates of return on immobile,  easily taxable  assets and other forms of
investiment.
The problems  of commitment  and time consistency  confront  all governments.  Political
structutres  that generate  predatory  government  behavior,  however, can exacerbate  an existing
time consistency  problem or even create one where  one would  otherwise  not exist. In section
17  See for example Collier and Garg (1996) who find that employment,  promotion, and access to publically
fimded professional training  in the public sector in Ghana is determined by kinship ties rather than by performance
or other indicators of productivity.
114, for example, we study a government  that is non-representative  in the sense of catering to the
interests of a subset  of the population.  Whereas  even a modest  administrative  cost will deter a
fully representative  government  from taxing  installed  capital  for the purposes  of effecting
transfers, a government  that is non-representative  in our sense  will have an incentive, ex post,
to renege on its announced  policy  in order to make transfers  to the favored  group. The higher
the transactions  costs associated  with taxation  and transfers, the less representative  the
government  needs to be to ensure that it will not make transfers. But unless transactions  costs
are high and borne by the favored  group, a non-representative  government  will require
additional mechanisms  to bind it to ex ante promises. Collier (1991)  argues forcefully  that the
absence  of effective  agencies  of restraint  in post-independence  Africa accounts  for the
persistence  of a capital-hostile  policy environment.
3.4 Microeconomic  channels  of uncertainty
We now turn to the relationship  between  policy-induced  uncertainty  and the level and
composition  of investment  [the second  column  of Figure 1]. The investment  and growth
literatures identify risk  aversion  of investors  and irreversibility  of investment  projects  as
distinct and fundamental  channels  through  which  uncertainty  about the returns on investment
may affect growth. Consider, for example, a firm facing  a mean-preserving  spread in the
distribution  of future output prices. If the firm is risk-neutral  and investment  is costlessly
reversible, the convexity  of the profit function in prices means that greater uncertainty
increases  expected  profits.' 9 Investment  therefore  rises. But if either assumption  fails, the rise
in uncertainty  may reduce investment.  Sufficiently  great risk aversion  does this by overcoming
the convexity  of the profit function, so that the firm's expected  utility falls with the rise in
uncertainty  even though expected  profits rise. Irreversibility  reduces  investment  either by
increasing  the option value of postponing  the investment  or by increasing  the probability that
the firm will prove, ex post, to have misallocated  its investment. 20
The presumption  in favor of composition  rather than level effects  is, if anything, stronger
Is The evolution  and/or development  of such  commitment  mechanisms  has been  extensively  studied  in the recent
political  science  and new institutional  economics  literature  (see  Rodrilc  and  Zeckhauser  (1987),  Kotlikoff et al,
(1988),  Persson  and Tabellini  (1994),  Soskice  et at (1992),  North  and  Weingast  (1989)  and McGuire  and Olsen
(1996)).
19  The profit function  is strictly  convex  in the output  price  as long  as the firm  can  adjust  some  dimensions  of
its production  plan  after observing  the price. These  adjustments  allow  the firm  to capitalize  on favorable  price
movements  and limit  the damage  of unfavorable  ones, so  that a mean-preserving  spread  in future  prices raises
average  profits.
20 The first of these  channels  has been  the dominant  one  in the theoretical  literature  on irreversible  investment
(see  Dixit  and Pindyck  (1993)).  The second  bears a strong  resemblance  to the mechanism  through  which  non-uniform
taxation  of capital  income  generated  growth  effects  in Section  3.2; its effects  operate  more  strongly  through  the ex
post productivity  of investment  than  through  the level  of investment.
12with irespect  to uncertainty  than with respect  to the (average)  level of distortions. The central
argument is a general-equilibrium  one: an increase  in uncertainty  about after-tax  future
inconmes  actually increases aggregate saving if risk-averse households have a precautionary
saving motive. This will dominate  the fall in investment  demand  if the interest elasticity  of
saving is sufficiently  low. And while  the long-run  effects  of uncertainty  are unclear in the case
of irreversible investments,  greater uncertainty  clearly  shifts investment  away from irreversible
capital  in the short run. 2" This compositional  effect is likely  to persist over the empirically
relevant horizon. Some evidence  that uncertainty  differentially  discourages  irreversible
investments  in Africa is provided  by Pattillo  (1996)  using firm-level  data from the Ghanaian
manufacturing  sector, and by Fielding (1996),  using sectoral  investment  patterns in South
Africa.
A potentially  important  set of compositional  effects  that rely on risk aversion come under
the heading of 'self-insurance'  mechanisms.  The literature  on rural institutions  gives a central
role to risk aversion  in explaining  the behavior  of peasants,  a group that makes up a larger
share of producers in Africa, on average,  than  in any other region in the world. But while the
thrust of this literature has been to emphasize  the positive  role of rural institutions  like rotating
saving/credit  clubs or interlinked  land tenure  and credit  arrangements  in coping with income
fluctuations  ex post, Morduch (1994,1995)  and others have recently  emphasized  that when ex
post mechanisms  are limited, households  will trade off expected  profits for a reduction in
income variability  ex ante. In this view, a peasant  household  will choose safer, lower-yielding
activilies in order to limit income  variability  to what is readily insurable  by available--but
costly and imperfect--ex  post mechanisms.  The micro-econometric  evidence  that exists  is
almost entirely built on the ICRISAT  data for a set of Indian villages,  but self-insurance
mechamisms  are likely to be at least as important  in Africa as in India (see, for example, Berry
(1993)). They imply that greater uncertainty,  even in the absence  of irreversibilities,  can lower
aggregate  growth. Appendix  I formalizes  this point using a stylized  endogenous  growth model.
Peasants choose between  a safe but low-yielding  activity  and a risky but higher-yielding  one. If
the re]Levant  risks are idiosyncratic  and therefore  diversifiable,  the social optimum  has all
peasants  choosing the risky activity. In the absence  of insurance  markets, however, peasants
self-insure  by choosing  the safe but lower-yielding  project, lowering  aggregate  growth and
welfare.
3.5 Government  policy and uncertainty
Tax and  tax-like policies  can adversely  affect  privately  perceived  economic  risks either by
undercutting  institutions  designed  to handle  risk or by directly  creating uncertainty  about the
after-tax returns on investment.  The first channel  emerges  naturally  from the literature on
financial  repression.  The emphasis  of that literature  has been  on interest rate controls  and other
21 With  irreversible  investment,  the effect  of increased  uncertainty  on the firm's long-nm  capital  stock  is
theoretically ambiguous. Increases in uncertainty lower a competitive  firm's investment  in the short run but, through
a 'lock-in' effect,  may actually  raise its expected  capital  stock  in the long  run (Abel  and  Eberly (1993)).
13distortions  that affect the quantity  and quality  of investment  along  the lines of Sections  3.1 and
3.2. The associated  disintermediation,  however, can slowr  the development  and impair the
risk-handling  capacity of the formal  financial  sector  as a whole, throwing  the private sector
back onto socially  inefficient  self-insurance  mechanisms  of the type described  above. The
empirical  evidence  on the importance  of financial  deepening  for growth (King and Levine
(1993)) is consistent  with either channel  or both.
Impairment  of the risk-sharing  function  of financial  institutions  has not generally  been
emphasized  in accounts  of African  economic  performance.  A more prominent  but often
implicit  theme has been that governments  actually  create economic  uncertainty  (e.g., Berry
(1993)). The theoretical  literature suggests  a variety of potentially  relevant  channels. In Khan
and Ul Haque (1985), for example, domestic  assets are subject  to the possibility  of
nationalization.  Individuals  know the probability  of nationalization  but have no way of
influencing  its occurrence.  They handle  this risk by finanlcing  high-yielding  domestic
investments  abroad and at the same time placing gross saving  in low-yielding  but safe foreign
accounts. The uncertainty  surrounding  nationalization  is important  here; in the Khan-Ul  Haque
model, individuals  would not diversify  abroad  if they faced a fixed tax on domestic  assets that
equalled  the expected  tax rate associated  with nationalization.  Similarly,  Rodrik (1989) shows
how rate-of-return  uncertainty  generated  by the possibility  of reversal of trade liberalizations,
exchange  rate reforms, or other policies  affecting  sectoral  relative prices discourages
irreversible  investment  in a manner  equivalent  to an increase  in the average tax rate. Appendix
I provides a third potential  example, in which  risk-averse  peasants  (or other firms) choose
between two safe and reversible  investments.  One strictly  dominates  the other in the absence  of
taxes, but being immobile,  is taxable  while  the low-yielding  alternative  is not. Then in a
no-tax equilibrium, the high-yielding  asset dominates  ancl  the private sector does not diversify.
By contrast, a stochastic  tax/subsidy  rate, even  with a mean of zero, will lead to socially
inefficient  diversification.
It is worth noting that the risk-creating  features  of the African policy  environment  offset a
natural capacity of proportional  tax systems  to diversify  idiosyncratic  risks and shift systemic
risk to the public sector (Atkinson  and Stiglitz  (1980)). Domar and Musgrave  (1944)  noted that
when tax rates are non-stochastic,  an increase  in the (proportional)  tax rate on income from a
risky, high-return  asset shifts a greater portion  of the underlying  rate-of-return  risk to the
government,  increasing  private incentives  for risk-taking.  While  this reasoning  has not been
applied in the developing  country literature  (Ahmed  and Stern (1988)), it raises  the possibility
that a tax increase  that in the absence  of uncertainty  would  have made the private sector worse
off may actually increase  growth  and welfare. 22
22 Private  risk-taking  rises  because  risk-averse  investors  have  an  incentive,  ignoring  the  wealth  effect  of the
higher  tax  rate,  to trade  off some  of the  lower  risk  for  a higher  average  return  on their overall  portfolio.  The
theoretical  relationship  between  taxes  and  risk-taking  is not robust  across  alternative  specifications  of the portfolio
problem,  however;  see for example  Atkinson  and Stiglitz  (1980,  Lecture  4) and  Sandmo  (1985).  Results  tend to
become ambiguous when the safe asset has positive return,  when there.  are many risky assets, or when there is no
loss offset, so that negative reurns on the risky asset do not reduce the investor's overall tax Liability.
144. Aid, taxation and investment
The lhrust of the previous  two sections  has been to establish  that tax and tax-like  policies  can
and do impair economic  performance.  As donor policy mobilized  behind  a 'policy failures'
diagnosis  in the late 1970s  and early 1980s,  political  scientists  were developing  arguments  that
embedded  these failures in the systems  of personal  rule that dominated  African  politics until
the 1990s. Bates (1981), Sandbrook  (1986)  and others saw the heavy use of patronage, the
discouragement  of restraining  institutions,  and the emasculation  of competing  centers of
political  power as 'rational' strategies  of African  leaders  in the context  of weak  political
legitimacy  and tenuous  bureaucratic  control. A central  theme  of these contributions  was the
existence  of a fundamental  conflict  of interest between  African  governments  and their own
private sectors:
"Quite apart from philosophic  predisposition,  however,  recent experiences  in Africa
and elsewhere  make it clear that the preferences  of governments  often bear little
correspondence  to any idealization  of the public interest. Rather, governments  engage
in bureaucratic  accumulation  and act so as to enhance  the wealth  and power or those
who derive their incomes  from the  public sector; they  also act on behalf of private
factions, be they social classes,  military  cliques,  or ethnic groups. They engage in
economic  redistribution,  often from the poor to the rich and at the expense  of economic
growth. These are central themes  in policy  formation  in Africa and their prominence
serves  to discredit  any approach  based  on a conviction  that governments  are agencies  of
the public interest." [Bates  (1996), p 17].
In this section  we incorporate  this conflict  of interest  in an intertemporal  model  relating tax
interventions  to growth. Since the uncertainty  channels  of policy  are less settled  both
empirically  and theoretically,  our model  focuses  on the 'distortion' effects  discussed  above.
We build in a central  role for composition  effects  by allowing  households  to choose between  a
high-yielding  but taxable  investment  and a lower-yielding  investment  that escapes  the tax net.
The resulting structure  (which fits in the southwest  box of Figure 1) captures key features  of
the preceding discussion  and is simple  enough  to allow a formal  exploration  of aid and the role
of conditionality.
To characterize  the underlying  conflict  of interest, we follow  Boone (1996)  and Olson and
McGuire (1996)  in assuming  that the government  is fully captive  to an interest group that
comprises  a fraction  0 ￿f  s 1 of the domestic  population.  By treating  the size of this interest
group as a parameter, we can trace out the consequences  of personal  rule from the least to the
most representative  -- in effect, from Mobutu  to Mandela. We treatf as predetermined,
leaving to later discussion  the process whereby  the leader identifies  his own interests  with that
of the favored  group. As in Boone (1996), the government  has the option of levying
distortionary  taxes in order to make transfers  to the favored  group. To reflect the reality of
most African fiscal systems,  we assume  that non-distortionary  forms of taxation are
unavailable.
15To capture necessary  and legitimate  forms of public  expenditure,  we introduce a second
parameter, G, measuring  the level of government  spending  on essential  public goods (such as
security from external military threat). Absent  foreign  aid, the implied 'revenue imperative'
means that even a fully representative  government  will engage in distortionary  taxation. By
treating G as a parameter, we have a simple  way of captLring  the difference  between (for
example)  Nigeria--with  oil wealth  representing  substantial  command  over public  goods per
capita, and with few external security  concerns--and  Malawi--with  a subsistence  economic  base
and (neighboring  not only South Africa but also Mozambique  and Zimbabwe)  a history of
serious  regional security concerns.  The level of G could be endogenized  without changing  the
analysis.'
4.1 Households
We focus on a two-period  analysis  in which households  receive  an income Yin the first period
of life and choose an investment  portfolio to maximize  a time-separable  utility function  defined
over present and future consumption.  Total investment  is split  between  a tax-free  project that
yields  R  >  0 per unit and a taxable  high-yielding  project that produces future output g(Ku),
where g'  > 0,  g"  < 0 and g'(0) > R. Using upper-  and lower-case  letters to denote first-
and second-period  values, respectively,  the maximized  value of household  utility  is given by
V(t,z;E)  =  Max  u(C) + /  u(c)  (1)
,K,  ,KLJ
subject to  C=  Y-  (KH+  KL)  (1.)
and  c=  (I - t)g(KH)  + RKL+ z  (1.2)
where C and c are consumption  in the two periods, 0  <  p 5  1 is the discount  factor, t is the
tax rate on output from the high-yielding  project, and z 2  0 is a non-negative  transfer from the
government  (lump-sum  taxation  is ruled out). We will assume  that although  the household
cannot borrow, this constraint  is not binding.
The first-order  conditions  in (1) imply (I - t)g'(K,)  = R, which yields an investment
function of the form
KH*  =  KR  [RI(l - t)],  Kil  I <  O.  (2)
The high-yielding  investment  is therefore  a declining  function  of both the tax rate and the
return on the non-taxed  investment.
Figure Al  shows the response of a household to an increase in the tax rate. Investment in
23 What  matters  is that  the  financing  of G require  some  level  of distortionary  taxation.  See  Olson  and  McGuire
(1996)  for  analysis  with  endogenous  G (but  without  foreign  aid).
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c falls  KHrises
An increase  in the tax rate  rotates  the set of feasible
consumption patterns  from Ebd to Eb'd'. The  optimal
consumption  choice shifts from point 1 to point 2.the high-yielding  asset falls, to a level at which its after-tax yield is again equal to the yield on
the non-taxed  investment.  This shrinks  the government's  tax base and reduces  the average
quality of investment. Aggregate  investment  (KH  + KD  rises, however, since households
increase  saving in order to smooth  out the fall in future  disposable  income.'  An important
property of the investment  function  (2) is that investment  in the taxable  asset is independent  of
both Yand z. This means that the government's  tax base is independent  of the distribution  of
either current income or future transfers, a feature  that simplifies  the analysis  considerably. 25
4.2 Government
The government  maximizes  the utility  of a select  subset  of the population,  as in Boone (1996).
With households  distributed  uniformly  over the unit interval, we can think of the favored
group as constituted  by any subset  with probability  mass 0 ￿f  ￿  1. The government  has two
instruments  at its disposal: the distortionary  tax t, which  is non-selective  in the sense that all
households  bear it, and the selective  transfer,  z, which  iis  enjoyed  only by the favored  group.
The government  must also meet the fixed public  spending  requirement  of G 2 0. Since our
focus is on distortions  from expected  future taxation, fiscal interventions  and foreign aid all
take place in period 2. We defer a discussion  of time consistency  issues to the end of the
section, assuming  for the present that the government  can credibly  set its tax and transfer  rates
in advance.
The government  therefore  chooses  t and the aggregate  level of transfers, T = fz, in period
I to solve  the problem:
Max  V(t, T/f, Y)  (3)
(t,z)
subject  to  T + G =  tg(K* 1 )  + A  (3.1)
T_  Ž0,  (3.2)
where  A is the inflow of aid in period 2. Equation  (3.1) is the government's  budget constraint.
It states that tax revenues plus aid are used to finance  either transfers  or public spending. We
assume that aid does not cover required spending,  so that the "net spending  requirement"  G-A
24 Disposable  future  income  falls  due  to higher  taxes  and  a lower  before-tax  yield  on the  household's  total
investment  portfolio;  fuure  output,  in contrast,  may  rise  or faU  depeniding  on  whether  the  increase  in total  investment
overcomes  the  deterioration  in the  average  yield.
25 This  aggregation  property  relies  on  the  linearity  of the  tax-free  production  function  and  is therefore  not
general.
17is positive. Since inequality  (3.2) rules out lump-sum  taxes, this implies that some degree of
distortionary  taxation (t >  0) is inevitable.
'The solution  to (3) is illustrated  in Figure A2, where we show  the government's  budget
constraint and a set of indifference  curves  corresponding  to its objective  function  V. Given the
value of G-A, the budget  constraint  is a Laffer  curve relating  aggregate  transfers to the tax rate
on income from the high-yielding  project. A rise in the tax rate increases  the feasible  level of
total transfers, up to the point where the tax-elasticity  of output from the high-yielding  project,
q(it), is unity:
q(t) =  -tg'(KH*(t))/g(Kl*(t)) =L.
Beyond  this point, further  increases  in the tax rate reduce  revenue and thereby total transfers.
The government's  net spending  requirement  is a parameter  of this Laffer curve: a rise in G-A
reduces feasible  transfers  dollar-for-dollar,  shifting  the curve vertically  downwards. Changes
inf,  in contrast, leave the curve unchanged,  since the investment  function is identical for the
favored and non-favored  groups.
The government's indifference  curves show  combinations  of t and T that yield constant
indirect utility for the favored  group. They are upward-sloping  because taxes reduce utility
while transfers raise it. They are also concave,  but the solution  is unique  if they are less
concave  than the Laffer curve, a reasonable  property that we will assume in what follows. 26
Since the high-yielding  investment  function  does not depend  on transfers, the indifference
curves are vertically  parallel. Changes  in the political  economy  alter their shape, however:  a
fall inf concentrates  a given transfer T on a smaller  group, flattening  out the indifference
curves.
Ignoring the nonnegativity  constraint  (3.2), the solution  to (3) takes  place at the point of
tangency between the Laffer curve and a government indifference curve. The optimal choice of
t satisfies  the condition
q  1 -f,  where q (0) >  Oand ,7'(t) >  0.  (4)
For a non-representative government (lowf  ),  th,is  generates an interior solution for both t and
T (point 1 in Figure A2), with a tax rate high enough  to finance  transfers  to the favored  group.
As the size of this group shrinks  towards zero, the indifference  curves rotate in a clockwise
26By the envelope  theorem,  dV/a  =  - ,Og(K)  in  d7Vl/JT  = (fljV/6c  =  6U/f, implymg  that  dT/dt =
fg(K,l along  an indifference  curve.  The  indifference  curves  are therefore  concave,  since  d 2T/dt 2
=  fg'(X,) > 0,
raising  at least  the possibility  of multiple  equilibria  or a failure  of the first-order  conditions.  These  problems  do not
arise, however,  if we choose  the production  function  g(K,) = AKC, for 0 < a < 1, in which  case the indifference
curvas  and  Laffer  curve appear  as in Figure  A2.
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The  government's  choice  of t and  T
T
V2  >  Vl
1  ~~~~~~~~~V,  >  Vo
G-A = o
G-A  > O
As f varies from 0 to fcIG-A),  the optimum at point 1
moves from point 2 to point 4. Further  increases  in f
move the tangency  towards point 3, but the:  optimal
policy remains  at point 4.direction and the equilibrium  moves  to the top of the Laffer  curve, where 'q  = I (point 2). A
perfectly representative  government,  in contrast (f = 1), wants to avoid the social cost of
distortionary  taxation. If lump-sum  taxation  were possible,  this government  would  choose
point 3, where  qf(t) =  t =  0 (its indifference curves being steeper than the Laffer curve at all
tax rates). With lump-sum  taxes  impossible,  this government  chooses  point 4 where the tax
rate is just large enough to meet the exogenous  public spending  requirement.
The most interesting  case is that of the government  that is not fully representative  (f <  1)
but nonetheless  does not make transfers.  Proposition  1 states  that as long as the net spending
requirement  is positive, a range of such  governments  will exist. The government  need only be
''sufficiently  representative"  in order to choose  zero transfers  (Boone  (1996), Olson (1994)).
Proposition  1: The 'sufficiently  representative"  government.
If G > A, there is a cutoff valuefe  < I above which  the government  will choose not to
make transfers.  All governments  withf  < fc  will make  transfers,  with the size of the
transfer (and  accompanying  tax rate) inversely  related  to the size of the  favored group.
Proof: See Appendix.
This proposition is intuitively  appealing.  With a positive  net spending  requirement,
distortionary  taxes  are strictly positive  even when transfers  are zero. The marginal social cost
of tax revenue is therefore strictly  greater than one, and the favored  group faces a substantial
share of this cost. A rise in aggregate  transfers  therefore  fails  a cost-benefit  test, even
accounting  for the concentration  of marginal  benefits.' If the favored  group is small, in
contrast, the distortion  is largely borne  by the non-favored  group, and a small increase  in the
tax rate generates a large enough  transfer  per member  of the favored  group to justify the
increase. 28 On the margin, a rise infincreases both the tax rate and aggregate  transfers  if the
latter are already positive.
In the following  sub-sections  we use the model  to examine  the effect of unconditional  and
conditional  aid on taxes and transfers, and therefore  on investment  and growth. Before  doing
so, however, note that the model  provides  an interpretation  of the "developmental  state" and
the relative influences  of exogenous  forces  and internal  political  economy  in generating  it. As
long asf  > f  c, the government  "gets the prices right" -- in this case, avoiding  excessive
distortion  of the relative yields  on alternative  forms of capital  -- and avoids transfers to special
interests. The transfer cutoff can therefore  be thought  of as the level of representation  above
which a government  internalizes  the general  interest in high-yielding  investment  and growth. A
27 If the net spending  requirement  were  zero, any  govermment  that  was not  fully representative  would find it
worthwhile  to impose a small  distortionary  tax.
2X1  We are treating  f as predetermined  here. Note, however,  that  free-rider  problems  and other  costs of
collective action create a strong  presumption  thatf is small.
19government  need only be "sufficiently"  representative,  according  to Proposition 1, to
constitute  a developmental  state. Moreover,  the cutoff level is a declining  function  of the net
spending  requirement.  Other things  equal, transfers  beoDme  a more expensive  luxury as G-A
rises, and they will emerge only if the favored  group faices  a small enough  share of the
marginal costs and enjoys a sufficiently  concentrated  marginal  benefit. The analysis  therefore
implies that adversity  -- for example, in the form of an external  military threat that generates  a
high G -- is more likely to produce  a developmental  stale  than ease, holding  constant the
historical, cultural  and economic  determinants  off.
Proposition 2: External  determinants  of the developmental  state.
A fall in G-A increases  the level of representationl  that is required  to generate  zero
transfers.
Proof:  The cutoff value off  is given byfc  = I-q(t)  <  1, where t solves t =
(G-A)/g(t)  (see Appendix).  Since t is an increasing  function  of G-A and a  is an
increasing function of t, we can writef  c = f  c(G-A), withf "  <  0.
4.3 Unconditional aid
We now turn to a more complete  analysis  of the effect of (anticipated)  aid, starting  first with
unconditional  aid. Under our assumptions,  an increase  in aid shifts the tangency  point of
indifference  curves and the Laffer curve vertically  upwatrds.  The response  to aid inflows
therefore takes the extreme form of Boone  (1996). A sufficiently  representative  government
reduces  taxes and retains zero transfers.  For this government,  aid crowds  in productive  forms
of domestic  capital  formation  by reducing  distortionary  future taxation. A government  that is
already giving transfers, in contrast, uses  an increase  in aid to increase  transfers  dollar for
dollar, leaving the tax rate unchanged.  These points  are illustrated  in Figure A3, where we
begin with a net spending  requirement  that is large enough,  givenf, to generate  zero transfers
(point 1). Small increases  in aid (represented  by the arrows)  go first into reductions  in the tax
rate, and then into higher transfers.
The non-representative  but non-redistributing  government  (moderatef ) again provides an
interesting  case. For this government,  small  increases  in aid reduce  distortions,  but a large
enough increase  also  justifies the initiation  of transfers  to the favored  group. This occurs while
distortionary  taxation  is still positive.  It is illustrated  in Figure A3 by a jump from point 1 to a
point like 3.
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Given  G,  a rise  in A shifts  the  Laffer  curve  upwards.  For  a
government  initially  giving  zero  transfers  (point  1),  aid inflows
first reduce  the  tax rate,  to point  2, and  then  go fully into
transfers,  through  point  3 to point  4 where  A=G.Proposition 3:  7he  effect of aid.
Forf Ž  f  , a small increase  in aid reduces  the tax rate without initiating  transfers. For
f  < f  c, in contrast, a= increase  in aid, whether  small or large, goes  fully into
transfers.  Moreover,  for a= government,  there is some amount of aid above which
transfers  will be initiated.  As long as the government  is not  fully representative  (so that
f  < 1), this will occur while the tax distortion  is still  positive (i.e., before aid  pays  for
all of required  public spending).
The analysis  of unconditional  aid is easy to summarize.  For a "developmental  state",
unconditional  aid reduces  distortions, thereby  delivering  benefits  greater than those attached
simply  to a consumption  transfer. But if this state  is not fully representative,  increased  aid may
also change the character  of domestic  taxation, so that distortionary  taxes  are on the margin
financing  not only the public good but also transfers  to t1he  favored  group. The latter possibility
underpins  Bauer's (1974) warning  that aid would  politicize  life in developing  countries. It also
provides some  interpretation  of the view (Bahl,  Kim and Park (1986))  that the cutoff of
American  aid to Korea in the early 1960s  encouraged  the emergence  of a developmental  state
there, a view echoed  by Williamson  (1995)  in describing  Taiwan's move towards greater
export orientation  in the 1960s. More generaUy,  the model  suggests  various ways  in which
conditionality  might be used to increase  the effectiveness  of aid.
4.4 Conditional aid
There are two quite separate  roles for conditionality  in the aid relationship.  The first is to
provide the recipient  with a way of committing  credibly  to a course  of action that is in the
recipient's own interest, independently  of the aid inflow. We have  assumed  thus far in this
section  that the government  can commit  to its tax and transfer  policy in advance. If it cannot,
our earlier discussion  of time consistency  is relevant  and even a fully  representative
govemment  may find itself on the "wrong" side  of the Laffer curve, in a low-investment,  high
tax equilibrium. 29 If penalties  can be made adequate  and credible, conditional  aid can then
move the recipient  to the good side of the Laffer curve. iCredibility  problems  therefore greatly
increase the apparent  scope for conditionality.  Collier (1991)  sees aid donors  as having  taken
on precisely  this role in post-independence  Africa, but with limited success  given their own
credibility  problems. We return to this issue  in Section  6.1 below.
The second, more conventional  role of conditionality,  which we will investigate  in this
section, is to support  aid flows in the face of a conflict  of interest  between the donor(s) and the
recipient. To root this conflict  in the recipient  country's political  economy,  we assume that the
donor is concerned  about the general welfare  in the recipient  country  rather than the welfare of
29  As noted  by Olson and McGuire (1996), even a highly  non-repiresentative  govermnent will want to commit
to tax and transfer policy in advance, in order to garantee that the private sector invests in the taxable  asset.
Making aid flows conditional on non-extortionary  policy is one way to do this.
21the favored group. This specification  is consistent  with  pure altruism  on the part of the donor,
but it may also be consistent  with other donor motivations. 30 A simple  specification  that
captures this feature is
W=  f[u(C,)  + pcJdh  +  6X,  (5)
where the integral goes over all households  (distributed  uniformly  over [0,1]) in the recipient
country, X is the donor's domestic  spending,  and 6 is the relative weight  the donor attaches to
this spending.  We have assumed  in (5) that household  utility is linear in second-period
consumption;  this is less general than  our earlier treatment  but simplifies  the analysis
considerably. 31 To avoid a corner solution  in which  all donor resources  go to foreign  aid, we
require that donor altruism  be limited  in the sense that 6 > ,.
Although  the donor's preferences  are defined  over C, c and X, we can readily express them
in terms of the fiscal policy variables  t and T. To do this, note first that the donor faces a
domestic  budget  constraint  of the form X + A  = D, where  D is (exogenous)  domestic
revenue. Combining  this with the recipient's  budget  constraint  (3.1) and eliminating  A, we get
the overall constraint
D  + tg(KH*(t)) =  X  + G + T.  (6)
Equation (6) simply states  that the total domestic  spending  of both players is limited by the
sum of their tax revenues. This constraint  ties t, T and  X together, since  all other variables  are
exogenous. Consider  a rise in T, for example,  holding  t constant.  By (6), X must fall because
with t fixed, the rise in transfers must have been financed  by an aid inflow. Viewed  as a
bargaining  game, the aid relationship  is about determining  both the size of the overall revenue
pie and its division  between alternative  uses.
With linear second-period  utility, the donor's objective  function  (5) is of the form V(t,O)
+3T#r  +  iX  .32  Substituting  (6) into this objective  function,  we obtain  the donor's valuation  of
alternative  choices of t and T:
W(t,T)  = V(t,O) -(6-  6)  T +  61D + tg  (KH*(t))  - GI.  (7)
Equation  (7) has two notable features.  First, aid flows  that generate  consumption  transfers
reduce the utility of the donor. This is a straightforward  implication  of  a  > 0 , and it has a
30  For example, there  may be positive  cross-country  externalities  to the general  welfare, such as a reduction
in spillovers from civil disorder.
31 With linear second-period  utility,  the future  income  distribution  is irrelevant  from the perspective  of the
donor, and  the donor's preferences  can be written  as a simple  function  of t and T.
32 With linear second-period utility,JV(t,T/z)  + (I-fi(Vt,0) + 6X  = V(t,O)  + 63T  +  SX.
22powerful implication  for unconditional  aid:
Proposition 4: Aid collapse.
A government  with  f  < f C(G) receives  no unconaitional  aid.
Proof:  Unconditional  aid can be thought  of as a Stackelberg  game in which the donor
moves first, pledging  an amount of future aid. The recipient  then formulates  tax and
transfer  policy and implements  these when the ai(d  flow arrives in period 2. By
Proposition  3, a recipient  withf < f 'G)  will spend  any aid inflow on transfers. By
(7), this will reduce the donor's welfare. Anticipating  this, the donor will choose  A =
0.
The second observation  about (7) is that the tax rate can be either too high or too low from the
donor's perspective.  Holding  T constant  and starting  at t = 0, a small increase  in the
distortionary  tax increases  the donor's domestic  spending  by more than enough to offset the
reduction in investment  quality and utility. But  as t rises, the deterioration  in the recipient's
economic  performance  eventually  dominates  and donor utility falls.
In Figure A4 we use these observations  to replace  the Laffer curve in our earlier diagrams
with a set of donor indifference  curves. Lower  indifference  curves mean higher utility for the
donor, while the reverse  is true for the recipient.  The donor's indifference  curves, like those of
the recipient, are vertically  parallel. We can show that their turning  point takes place where  the
elasticity  of g(K,J with respect  to the tax rate (defined  earlier as q(t)), is equal to 1 - (0/a6).
Since ni  is an increasing  function  of t, this takes  place to the left of the revenue-maximizing  tax
rate, denoted  t.  in the diagram. We also identify  the tax rate tT(f)  in the diagram, which is the
rate corresponding  to tangencies  between  the Laffer  curve and the recipient  government's
indifference  curves. These tangencies  take place  where ri(t) =  I -f.  We have drawn the case
in whichf  <  //6, which implies that the donor's indifference  curves  peak to the left of tT).
We can now illustrate  the role of conditionality  when unconditional  aid is undermined  by
political  economy  considerations.  We begin  by arguing  that there will typically  be gains from
aid, even when unconditional  aid is zero. This is illustrated  in Figure A4, where we assume
thatf is low enough (given G) that transfers  are positive  even in the absence  of aid inflows (f
< f(G)).  The no-aid equilibrium  is at point 1. By Proposition  4, this is also the aid
equilibrium  in the absence of conditionality,  since  the recipient's response  to aid (indicated  by
the vertical arrows) makes  the donor worse off. The diagram  makes  clear, however, that
although  aid is zero without  conditionality,  the  potential gains  from aid are strictly  positive.
Any point inside the hatched  area increases  the utility of both the donor and the recipient
government,  relative to the zero-aid  point. Proposition  5 generalizes  this observation.
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C: unconditional  aid
S: "Stackelberg"  equilibrium  without conditionality
RD:  contract curve
(  :  area of gains  from aidProposition  5: The  gains  from aid.
Regardless  of the recipient's  political economy,  there  are some values of Gfor which
gains  from aid exist. Forf  <  p16, gains exist  for all values  of G. Forf  2  p16,  gains
exist whenever  G is low enough to induce  transfers  in the absence  of aid or high enough
to push the tax rate above the rate satisfying q  (t) =  I  - (P16).
What is the precise role of conditionality  in securing  the gains from aid? In the case illustrated
in Figure A4, aid-supported  conditionality  that lowers  the tax rate even slightly  makes both
donor and recipient  better off. But a Pareto  efficient aid contract  would  call for a reduction  all
the way to t,  in order to reach the contract  curve. Proposition  6 gives a more complete
account  of the role of conditionality,  distinguishing  its rcole  in preventing  a collapse  of aid from
its role in securing  an efficient aid contract.
Proposition 6: The role of conditionality.
The role of conditionality  depends  on the values  qf f  and G. Define GC()  as the critical
value of public spending  below  which transfers  are initiated  [G'(t) solves
f  r = fC((G  ))j  There  are five  regions:
(Region  1) Forf  <  p16 and G 2 GU(f),  conditionality  is not required  to secure
some gains  from aid, but it is required  to secure  a Pareto  efficient aid contract.
(Region  2) Forf  < p/6 and G < U(f), conditionality  is required  to secure  any
gain whatsoeverfrom  aid.
(Region  3) For f  Ž p16 and G Ž  9((pM6),  a Pareto  efficient  aid contract  can be
reached  mthout conditionality.
(Region  4) For f  2 P/6 and G(f  5 G < G'(I616),  conditionality  has no role;
there are no gains  from aid.
(Region  S) Forf 2  p16 and G < GP(t),  conditionality  is required  to secure any
gain whatsoeverfrom  aid.
The five regimes are illustrated  in Figure A5.
We conclude  this section  by discussing  the form of conditionality.  In Figure A4, the
hatched  region represents  the set of choices  of t and T that generate  Pareto improvements  over
the no-aid point. We can think of the players  as bargaining  over t and  A, since with G
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1: Aid positive but inefficient  without
conditionality.
2: A=O without conditionality;  conditionality
reduces  t, and T may rise or fall.
3: Conditionality  not needed  for efficiency.
4: No gains exist.
5: A=O without conditionality;  conditionality
reduces both t and T.predetermined  any two of the variables  t, T and  A determines  the third. What combination  will
be chosen, if both donor and recipient can costlessly enforce commitments regarding aid flows
and tax rates? We cannot  determine  the exact form of a conditional  aid contract without
specifying  the precise bargaining  game between the donor and the recipient. We can, however,
make the following  observations:
Proposition  7: The nature of conditionality.
Any conditional  aid contract  reduces  the distortionary  tax rate. If the donor  has
substantial  bargaining  power relative  to the recipient,  the accompanying  fall in tax
revenue  will be partly  financed by an increase  in aid and  partly by a reduction  in
transfers. If the recipient  has substantial  relative  bargaining  power, the implied
reduction  in tax revenue  may actually  be more  than offset by aid inflows, allowing  a net
increase in transfers.
Propositions  4-7 conform with certain features  of the evolution  of the aid relationship  in
Africa, notwithstanding  the clear weakness  of the model  in characterizing  donor motivations
during the Cold War era. The analysis  ties the emergence  of conditionality  in the 1970s  to
deteriorating  domestic  policy choices  associated  with increasingly  non-representative  political
structures. The increasing  tightness  of conditionality  starting  in the 1980s, and especially  in the
1990s, can be associated  with exogenous  events  that dramatically  increased  the relative
bargaining  power of donors. In the next two sections  we discuss  various extensions  and
implications  of the analysis.
5. Extending  the analysis
In the model  of Section 4, leaders sacrifice  growth for the sake of transfers  to a favored group.
An alliance  between  donors and the 'general  interest' in recipient  countries  then creates a
strong case for conditionality  over tax and tax-like  distortions.  How robust is this message  to
extensions  or modifications  of the model?  What challenges  does the analysis  pose for the
design of conditionality?  We address  the first of these questions  in this section, focusing
particularly  on the nature  of personal  rule and the sources  and implications  of policy
uncertainty. Section  6 then takes up the implications  for conditionality.
5.1 Autocrats  and growth
Olson (1994)  argues that in a system  of personal  rule the striousness of the predation  problem
depends  on the planning  horizon of the leader. Leaders  wilh long horizons  internalize  the
collective  interest in economic  growth; those  with short horizons  sacrifice  the collective
interest to maximize  their short-term  rents. A number  of African  leaders have  enjoyed long
periods in power; does this invalidate  the analysis?
While short horizons exacerbate  the underlying  conflicl:  of interest (most  dramatically  in
25the case of time consistency  problems),  the conflict  itself is rooted in the political  economy  and
persists even if leaders have  infinite horizons. 33 Moreover,  even with the notional  protection  of
single-party  political  structures  and other constraints  on domestic  contestibility,  executive
transitions  in Africa have been violent and, in some  countries, frequent  as well (Sandbrook
(1986), Alesina and Perotti (1994)). A high ex ante  probability  of transition  reduces the
effective  planning  horizon, particularly  when transitions  force incumbents  into a position of
economic  exile (or death) rather than  returning  them to a normal  civilian  life.34
A final reason why long horizons  may fail to rescue development-oriented  behavior  in
systems  of personal rule is that leaders  face a tradeoff  between  their own tenure in office and
the overall performance  of the economy.  Very poor performance  is to be avoided, since it
increases  the probability  of a coup; but very successful  performance  may  reduce collective
action problems  in the private sector, create  countervailing  centers  of economic  power, and
speed  institutional  innovations  that in the absence  of external  security  threats would eventually
repudiate  or eviscerate  personal  rule. Thus Diamond,  et al (1990)  observe  that:
"...the most common  and in the long run the most important  effect of rapid
socioeconomic  development  under  authoritarian  rule has been to generate pressures  and
create social structural  conditions  more  conducive  to democracy..."[page 19].
A sirnilar  tension  emerges if causality  goes from institutional  developments  to growth, rather
than the reverse. Collier (1991), for example, argues  that agencies  of restraint like a free press
and an independent  central bank (or, in principle,  conditional  aid) contribute  to growth by
placing limits on predation.  But conflicts  over current  policy  choices  imply conflicts  over the
rules governing  those choices. Non-representative  leaders  may therefore  actively oppose  the
development  of such agencies, even if they are in the public  interest.
These observations  strengthen  the tension  between  autocratic  rule and growth that is central
to the analysis in Section  4. They also bring out an important  distinction  between external and
internal threats in such systems.  We noted in Section  4 that a greater externally-driven  revenue
imperative  can transform  the policy  choices  of a non-representative  leader into those of a
"developmental  state". Here the common  interest  in secure  borders overcomes  a distributional
conflict of interest that would otherwise  undercut  growth. A similar  effect operates with
respect to time consistency  problems:  dissembling  is costly  even to a non-representative
government.  But the opposite seems  likely  to hold if the primary threats  are to the tenure or
33  Boone (1996) studies precisely this case.
34 ,Short  horizon'  effects abound in the African policy literature. In Ghana, insecurity of tenure may help
explaia the persistence of an overvalued exchange rate (Ansu (1996)). In Kenya, the difference between Presidents
Moi and  Kenyatta is often attributed to the greater security of the Kikuyu-based  Kenyatta regime (Bigsten  and Moene
(1996)). In Tanzania, the emergence of high-level  corruption in the early 1990s may in part be associated in part
with the temptations of a second and final term of President Mwinyi, who was constitutionally  prevented from
running  for a third  term.
26autonomy  of incumbent  leaders. These drive a wedge  between  the general interest and that of
the incumbent  group, which now acquires  an interest in opposing  developments  that would
undercut  its own flexibility  and longevity.  On the empirical  side, these distinctions  call to mind
the contrasting  economic  performance  of authoritarian  regimes  in Asia, on the one hand, and
Africa and Latin America, on the other. Alesina  and Perotti (1994)  attribute the lack of a
systematic  cross-country  relationship  between  democracy  and growth to the high cross-country
variance of outcomes  for authoritarian  regimes, with high-growth  autocracies  in Asia balanced
by low-growth  autocracies  in Africa and Latin  America.
Conditionality  may differ radically  if institutional  developments  are the fundamental  issue,
and we return to this theme  below. We turn first to a discussion  of uncertainty,  however,
emphasizing  uncertain  succession  and reversible  reform  as two sources  of uncertainty  in the
African environment.
5.2 Incorporating uncertainty
We argued above that uncertain  succession  shortens  the planning  horizon  of incumbent  leaders.
A second effect, however, is to make the policy regime stochastic.  In our model, uncertain
succession  would mean uncertainty  about the composition  and potentially  the size of the
favored  group. Future transfer incomes  would  therefore  become  stochastic,  and if the sizes of
contesting  groups differed, tax rates would  be stochastic  as well.
These effects  could well strengthen  the case for conditionality  over the tax rate, to offset
the growth-reducing  consequences  identified  in Section  3. A low and effective  ceiling on the
tax rate, for example, would  reduce not only the average  distortion  (as in Section  4) but also
the uncertainty  around this average  and the uncertainty  about future transfer  income.
Moreover, conditionality  designed  to reduce  the intertemporal  variance  of allowable  tax rates
could improve performance  even if average  tax rates were unchanged.  This is an important
area for future work; at the moment  the results seem  likely to be complex  and highly
model-dependent.  "
Policy reform has been a second  source of policy uncertainty  in Africa, and one that has
operated at least as fundamentally  within  political  regimes  as across regime transitions.  The
structural  adjustment  programs of the 1980s  and their more recent successors  have in some
cases been associated  with an increase  in uncertainty  and a continued  flight to liquidity on the
part of the private sector (e.g., Aryeetey  (1994)). In part this is because  adjustment  programs
share the characteristics  that lead to the waiting  behavior  characterized  by Dixit and Pindyck.
35  We emphasized earlier  that formalizing  these effects is more treacherous in the case of tax uncertainty than
in the case of non-stochastic  distortions. For example, suppose that two imain  groups alternate stochastically in
power, so that the tax rate follows a two-state Markov process. Aizenman and Marion (1993) imbed such a tax
process in an overlapping generations model with irreversible investments. One natural way of characterizing  a rise
in uncertainty is to ask what happens when the higher of the tax rates  increases and the lower of the two decreases.
From the low-tax regime, such an increase in uncertainty reduces investment, as one might expect with irreversible
investment. But in the high-tax world, investment  may increase, in large part because the prospect of a subsequent
reduction exerts a greater attraction.
27The programs  are inherently  complex  -- not to mention  imperfectly  understood  even amongst
professional  economists  -- and since  the desired  reallocation  of resources  is at least partly
irreversible, the domestic  private sector has an incentive  to await the arrival of new
information  on the the profitability  of investments  (as in Rodrik (1989)). An important
proximate source of the relevant  uncertainty  may be the waiting  behavior  of governments
themselves,  who implement  cosmetic  reforms  while retaining  the option of substantial  and
irreversible changes. In the case of the private sector the reform  environment  raises the value
of maintaining  a liquid portfolio  of assets.
By "rationalizing"  distortionary  policy choices, the analysis  of Section  4 suggests  a link
between policy uncertainty  and what political  scientists  call the "orthodox  paradox" of
economic  reform in Africa: what incentives  do incumbent  regimes have to reverse economic
policies  that they themselves  had implemented  and had not chosen  voluntarily  to change? 36 Can
external pressures  cement  market-oriented  reforms?  Concerns  about the extent of the orthodox
paradox are widespread  (see Gordon, 1993  for example).  Leith and Lofchie  (1993) analyze  the
Ghanaian  case:
"The principal explanation  .. [for why "the reform  program  is not generating
substantial  ongoing  economic  growth" is that] .. the [Rawlings]  government  remains
ambivalent  in its underlying  attitude  towards  the idea of a market-based  economy  and
this ambivalence  continues  to engender  a certain  amount  of insecurity  and reluctance
among would-be  Ghanaian  entrepreneurs"  (p. 280).
The government's ambivalence  reflects  the tension  discussed  earlier between  the gains  accruing
from reforms  which solve  the government's  commitment  problems  and the costs of increased
contestability  on the other. The major policy  reforms  of the 1990s, more so than the reforms
of the 1980s, have as a common  feature  the substantial  removal  of discretion  in tax and
tax-like  policies. Thus policies  of exchange  rate unification,  trade liberalization,  financial
libera]lization,  privatization  and in particular  the support  for competitive  elections,  all
undermine  the scope for executive  discretion,  improving  the capacity  to commit  to policy
measures, but at the cost of making  the political  system more  contestable.  The immediate
result may be partial, fitful implementation 37 and an increase  in the uncertainty  faced by the
private sector.
36 More  generally,  the  orthodox  paradox  is the claim  that  market-oriented  reforms,  the  aim  of which  is to
diminish  the  role of government  in favor  of private  markets,  require  a strong  and committed  state  to be successful.
Reforms  can  fail, in this  view,  because  they  are  at odds  with  the  executive's  preferences  (as in our  discussion);  or
because  they  violate  a political  equilibrium  in other  ways,  for  example  by  removing  patronage  mechanisms  essential
to bureaucratic  compliance  and/or  political  stability.
37-
3Bates  and  other  suggest  that  the  partial  implementation  of programs  of reform  reflects  the fact  that  incumbent
rulers  will  only seek  to imnplement  reforms  up  to the  point  that  the  marginal  gain  (additional  resources)  equal  the
marginal  cost (constraints  on autonomy).
286. Implications  for conditional  aid
The discussion  of the previous section  complicates  but does not undermine  the rationale  for
policy conditionality  identified  in Section  4. In this section  we bring donors back into the
picture and explore some of the limitations  of conditional  aid.
6.1 The Samaritan's  Dilemma
In the previous section, the donor's distaste  for direct transfers  allowed  it to credibly  threaten  a
withdrawal  of aid if conditions  were not met. In reality, donors  may find it difficult to carry
through such threats. Policy failures that weigh  heavily  on the disenfranchised  will confront
donors with strong  pressures  to renegotiate,  in the hope of channeling  some  portion of aid
flows to these groups in period 2. Donors  in this situation  face a "Samaritan's  Dilemma"
(Buchanan  (1975)):  unable  to resist protecting  the private sector when policy failure occurs,
they will fail to protect the private sector from policy failure  itself. In response  the private
sector, believing  (correctly)  that the donor is unable  to act as its agent in restraining  the
predatory instincts  of the government,  will be unprepared  to commit  resources  to investments
with high social but low (after-tax)  private returns. In an extreme  case, a non-representative
govemment  may be able to capture the donor in a permanent  aid relationship  that replicates  the
outcome  of unconditional  aid discussed  in section  4. In thiis  case, even a permanent  flow of aid
is rendered  ineffective  by the donor's inability  to commit  to punish the recipient.
The time inconsistency  of donor threats  will often be less starkly  defined. For example,
suppose  that the donor has the capacity  to provide  poverty relief directly  to the private sector
(through  direct delivery, for example, or through  the use of NGOs or other means of
bypassing  central  government).  If there are costs involved  with working  through  the
government  (arising  from the "institution-building"  aspect  of conditional  lending), then from
an ex post perspective,  poverty alleviation  through  the government  is less effective,
dollar-for-dollar,  than direct service  delivery.  If the optimal  policy  ex ante is to incur the
institution-building  costs, the donor faces a time consistency  problem. In the absence  of a
pre-commitment  mechanism,  it will choose  direct  delivery  ex post.
The severity  of the Samaritan's Dilemma  may  vary across  types of donor. Multilateral
donors such as the Bretton  Woods  institutions  are not constitutionally  required to lend to all
member  governments,  but their intemal governance  structures  may make selectivity  difficult or
undercut  its credibility  (Collier, Guillaumont,  Guillaumont  and Gunning  (1997)). In this
respect, bilateral  donors may find it easier to threaten  an individual  country  with the
withdrawal  of aid. However, bilateral  donors  whose  own private sectors have developed
coalition  interests  with the recipient  government  may be much less unconstrained  than this
contrast suggests. For example, ex-colonial  donors such as the UK and France may  be equally
unable  to credibly threaten  to cut off aid. Clientilist  interests  may also arise from more
self-interested  donor concerns,  such as avoiding  the immigration  consequences  or regional  or
29humanitarian  spillovers  of economic  hardship  in the recipient  country. 38
Samaritan's Dilemma  problems  of this sort have given  rise to an extensive  literature on the
design of schemes  for resource transfers  aimed at bolstering  the donors  capacity to induce
changes in recipient  behavior  (see for example,  Bruce and Waldeman,  (1988)  and Coate
(1995) on altruism  and the Samaritan's  dilemma  in welfare transfers,  and Pietrobelli and
Scarpa (1992)  and Svensson  (1995)  on altruism  and donor credibility).
6.2 Dependence and graduation
A deeper limitation  of policy conditionality  emerges  when we view donor and recipient  as
interacting  through  time, not simply  in a one-shot  relationship.  On the positive  side, repeated
interactions  may generate some  limited  scope  for mechanisms  that alleviate  time-consistency
problems. But even if time consistency  problems  are solved, a fundamental  limitation  remains:
conditionality  over t alone locks  the donor and recipient  into a permanent  relationship.  Unless
eitherf or G changes  over time, either autonomously  or in interaction  with economic  growth
or aid flows, the donor must act as an agency  of restraint  in perpetuity.  This is inconsistent
with the preferences  of donors  and the private sector, both of whom  regard "graduation"  from
aid dependency  as a longer-run  objective  of aid policy.
Wlhile  an explicit analysis  of graduation  is beyond  the scope  of this paper, the analysis  of
section 4 provides some clues  for thinking  about the basic  issues. In particular, the distinction
between t andf in that model  mirrors an important  practical  distinction  between  what might be
called "policy" and "process"  conditionality,  one that  becomes  essential  when repeated
interaction  is considered.
Donors in section  4 (and in the 1980s  in Africa)  treat political  economy  (as summarized  by
f  ) as predetermined  and use conditionality  to restrict the government's  choices  of economic
policy (t and 7). Aid bargains  are conditional  in precisely  those cases  in which the contract
curve is off the expansion  path for thef-type government  (e.g., the path from N to C in Figure
A3). However, noting that the underlying  budget  constraint  is independent  of the political
economy, each point on the contract  curve is also located  on an expansion  path for some other
value of J* > f.  In principle, therefore, it would  be possible  to arrive at the same (T,t,A)
outcome  by defining the aid contract  in the current period in the form 1t*,AJ.  In this case aid is
conditioned  directly  on a change  in the recipient's  political  economy,  and the political
economy  itself then (unconditionally)  determines  the level of taxation  and transfers  associated
with the aid flow. 39 Rather  than being defined  over policy choices, conditionality  in this case is
3s As emphasized in the introduction, the end of the Cold War has removed an important global-strategic
motivation for aid clientilism in Africa. Concems about the spread of militant Islamic influences in Africa may begin
to emerge in a similar role, at least for the US.
39 Notice also that exogenous changes which altered G could also serve to alter the character of a given political
economay,  where as a result of the collapse of an external security threat the reduced (distortionary) cost of providing
G induces the same government to start macking  transfers.
30defined over the policy process itself. This type of conditilonality  is clearly much less precise,
but has tended  to consist of, for example,  reforms to constitutional  and legislative  structures
through competitive  parliamentary  elections  and the shifting  of power to legislative
committees;  judicial reforms; support  for key institutions  in the realm of civil society, such as
trade unions  and a free press; and policies  supporting  the emergence  of restraining  interest
groups in the private sector, such as privatization  programs  aimed  at widening  share
ownership.
In a one-shot  aid relationship,  the two forms of contract seem  equivalent.  What
differentiates  them in a multi-period  context  is the possibility  thatf is a "deeper"  parameter
than t or T, one that is less easily reversed.' Unlike  changes  in t, which  are temporary,
changes  inf alter the recipient's no-aid position,  N, in future periods. An increase  inf shifts
the government  to a new position  of tangency  on the no-aid laffer curve, shifting the no-aid
point in Figure A3 some  distance  to the left of N, consistent  with a lower value of t and lower
(or zero) T. The no-aid point in these  circumstances  is no longer the "threat point" as in the
case of the aid contract defined  over current  policy choices,  but the desired outcome  of
conditionality  over the policy process.
If changes  inf are irreversible,  the recipient  will require greater compensation  to accept  a
change  inf than to commit to the resulting  t for a single  period. To the favored group, the cost
of accepting  conditionality  overf is the present  value of the future stream  of rents foregone.
Unless the recipient  fully discounts  the future beyond  the next period, political  conditionality
will be more costly, particularly  if there is scope  for rents to accrue from the time
inconsistency  of the donor. The aid flow required  to change  the policy  process will therefore
be higher than that required simply  to alter the recipient's  policy  choice in a one-shot  bargain.
Two features of the 1990s, however, make the observed  shift of donors towards "political
conditionality"  less surprising.  First, the greater unanimity  and stronger  relative bargaining
power of donors has enhanced  their credibility,  undercutting  the expected  future rents of
recipients  in the aid relationship.  Second,  internal  pressures  for democratization  have increased
the discount rate of government  leaders  by reducing  their expected  length  of tenure.
The possibility  of altering  f irreversibly  therefore  brings  out possibilities  of graduation
which  previously  were not available. Of course, if the donor is not credible  then whether
conditionality  attaches  to the political  economy  or to the tax rate and level of transfers  is
immaterial. However  the relevant  difference  between  the two approaches  is that
f-conditionality  requires  donor credibility  only over the short-run, not permanently.  In
sufficiently  straitened  circumstances  incumbents  may  discount  the future heavily and accept
conditionality  overf even though  it may undermine  their discretionary  powers in the future.
40 The recent literature on political lobbying  examines  the issue of policy persistency from the perspective of
behavior of groups of net beneficiaries for whom it becomes worthwhile  to resist return from the policy (see  Coate
and Morris (1995)). Other important factors in the creation of persistence effects are that there may be uncertainty
over the consequences of reforms so that only once reforms are introduced  will groups fight to retain newly acquired
entitlements. Similarly, coordination failures or threshold effects may pnwvent  the emergence of agencies of restraint,
but once established -- perhaps through conditional  aid -- they will not be reversed.
316.3 Configuring  process conditionality
The superficial  attraction  of conditionality  onf masks  at least two fundamental  problems. The
first, noted above, is understanding  how  and why changes  inf may be more permanent  than
changes  in t. The second  is understanding  not only how the institutions  that are summarized  by
the parameterf constrain  the actions  of the government,  but more importantly  how they evolve
over time and how their evolution  is influenced  by aid. The following  observations  illustrate
the scope  of these problems.
First, it may be that societies  eventually  solve  their development  problems  as a result of the
evolution off over time. This may  result from exogenous  factors  acting as stimuli  to changes
inf,  or through the endogenous  determination  off itself. The latter process  is described  in
Persson and Tabellini  (1994)  and in North and Weingast  (1989)  wheref (in our parlance)  is no
longer parametric  but is a function  of the level and distribution  of productive  capital. As the
stock of capital  grows and particularly  as its distribution  becomes  more concentrated  (which
may be faster or slower depending  on the initial size off),  so the incentive  to constrain  the
predatory instincts of the government  increases,  and the political  economy  is able to sustain
low taxation. 4'
Ilt  is tempting  to take these examples  as indicating  a specific  role for aid, either conditioned
over current policy choices  or over the political  economy  itself. For example, taking the
Persson and Tabelinni  case (temporary)  aid conditioned  over T and t, which  accelerates  the
accumulation  of K,,, would  eventually  lead to the emergence  of a self-sustaining  political
economy  in which  there is a sufficient  economic  stake  in the taxable  assets to ensure that the
taxation  instincts of the government  are circumscribed.  In these circumstances,  direct
conditionality  onf may not be necessary  to bring  about graduation:  simply  holding  the
recipient's feet to the fire long enough will suffice. Coate and Morris (1995)  apply this logic in
a lobbying model  of political  equilibrium,  and show  that there are conditions  under which
policy choices underpinned  by temporary  conditionality  can become  irreversible.  Similarly,
direct conditionality  overf may be required to generate  graduation  when collective  action
failures prevent the independent  emergence  of institutions  and the growth off.  In this case, aid
condiitioned  directly on the political  economy  may  help to internalize  the extemalities,
mirroring the role that early views of foreign  aid expected  extemal financial  capital  to play in
solving big-push  extemalities. Specifically  conditionality  which reduces  information  costs --
for example through conditionality  on freedom  of speech  and association  or on legal
representation  -- may contribute  to the increase  in f.
Set against these examples,  however, is the possibility  that aid may serve to crowd out the
development  of domestic  agencies  of restraint. This, of course, retums to the critique  of aid
which motivated  this paper. One such example  would  be where aid undercuts  the emergence  of
social contracts  that support  ex-ante  policy announcements.  For example, in the social contract
41  Persson and Tabellinni (1994) focus on the capacity of different forms of political organization to constrain
governments, arguing that 'representative"  forms of democracy in which legislative power is delegated to those most
heavily endowed with taxable assets will secure low taxation more easily than "direct" forms of democracy.
32model of Soskice,  Bates and Epstein  (1992)42,  a rule-based  institution  solves  the
time-consistency  problem of incumbent  government.  Political  deputies (the young  generation),
knowing  that they will inherit the instruments  of office in the future, have an incentive to abide
by a social contract in which they incur the costs of monitoring  the current incumbent
government.  By shouldering  the costs of monitoring  today they raise the current level of
investment, which  raises the future tax base and thus their own potential  revenue. 43 However,
this form of contract  relies on two important  factors. The first is that politicians  must have
political  ambition,  in the sense defined  above. Their interest in power must exceed the
capitalized  value of the rents that may  accrue from expropriation.The  second  crucial factor is
that the incumbent  must be accountable  to the requirements  of the young  generation: "leaders
must not be able to replace  deputies who  refuse to cooperate  with leaders who abuse their
positions" (Soskice  et al p. 554). In these  circumstances  aid which  allows incumbents  to resist
the discipline  of their deputies,  or aid which serves  to blunt the political  ambition  of the
deputies  will lead to a collapse  of the institution  of restraint  and a reversal to a low-investment,
low-growth  situation.
In all three of these  cases we are faced with a much  greater problem, namely knowing
how, in practice, aid flows would  interact with nascent  political  institutions.  As it is, the
positive theory of institutional  evolution  is in its infancy:  at this stage  this paper can only
highlight  what seem to be the important  component  mechanisms.  However  we do know that
poorly designed  or inadequately  implemented  or enforced  conditionality  overf may itself be an
important  source of uncertainty.  Rodrik (1989)  used this observation  to argue that sustainable
but modest  economic  policy reforms  may be superior  to those  that would  generate higher
welfare if sustained,  but that have a substantial  probability  of reversal. A similar argument
holds with respect to conditionality  overf. Conditionality  with respect  to modest  but
sustainable  institutional  changes  may well be superior  to rnore  ambitious  conditions  that
generate  larger uncertainties.
7. Conclusions
To say that institutional  failures are central  to Africa's poor economic  performance  is not to
repudiate  earlier interpretations  based  on policy  failures  and capital  shortages.  In the
framework  developed  here, institutional  failures  produce  policy failures  which in turn  produce
capital shortages  or the equivalent.  The problem, instead,  is that the design of effective  aid
programs depends  on the diagnosis.  Our aim in this paper has been to capture the analytical
42 This is broadly the same as the Kotlikoff, Persson and Svensson (1988)  model.
43 In this overlapping-generations  model the intergenerational  social contract emerges as a sub-game perfect
equibrim  sobtion  to the time-consistency  problem under  the condition that the monitoring  generation has a
sufficient interest  in its own future status. Given this political 'ambition", which means that deputies value the fiuure
more highly  than does the market,  deputies not only incur the cost of monitoring incumbents  today, but also expect
to be constrained to the same extent in the future by their  successor generation.
33core of the evolving  (primarily  external)  diagnosis  of the African  development  problem. In
attemrpting  this we have tried to be guided  by the broad stylized  facts about the African  policy
environment  and by the main features  that political  scientists  associate  with the African state.
Three basic observations  make this a relevant, and unfinished  exercise. First, donors as a
group are currently  in a position  of overwhelming  bargaining  strength  with respect to major
African aid recipients, with extraordinary  scope  for implementing  the political  and institutional
condiitionality  suggested  by the current  diagnosis.  Second,  while the political  economy  and
institutional  development  literatures  are full of potentially  relevant  material, they offer little
systeimatic  guidance  as to what constitutes  best practice for donors  when institutional  failures
are irnportant.  Third, the decade  of the 1990s  has seen the most substantial  political
developments  in  many African countries  since  independence.  These changes  open new
opportunities  for donors  but at the same time place  a premium  on understanding  the underlying
continuities  that will condition  the sustainability  of alternative  interventions.
We conclude  in this section  with a list of our main  points and suggestions  for further work:
--  Tax and tax-like distortions  tend to be high and volatile  in Africa. These influence  the
allocation of national  wealth  and are capable,  according  to standard  economic  theory,
of reducing  both the level and the productivity  of domestic  investment.  While more
empirical evidence  is required,  the composition  of domestic  investment  appears  to be
mnore  important  in explaining  poor African  growth  than the level of domestic
investment.
--  Policy-generated  uncertainty  plays  an important  but underemphasized  role in the
literature on African  political  economy.  Such uncertainty  can activate socially
i-nefficient  self-insurance  mechanisms  that lower  growth. When leaders  have substantial
diiscretion  over policy, as in most African  countries,  executive  transitions  can be a
mlajor  source of policy uncertainty.
--  Political scientists  emphasize  the heavy  use of patronage  in African  systems  of personal
rule. Many of the unifying  themes  of this literature  are well captured  by a simple analytical
miodel  in which governments  use distortionary  taxes to finance  transfers  to politically
powerful groups.
--  A government  that is captive  to a favored  group will trade off growth for transfers,
provided the favored  group is sufficiently  small  relative  to the government's  disposable
resources. In such a case, conditional  aid can be completely  ineffective  in spurring
investment  and growth even when the potential  gains  from aid are large.
--  Conditionality  is required to secure the gains  from aid when non-representative  political
structures  generate  a conflict  of interest  between  donors  and recipient  govemments.
When donors  are in a strong  bargaining  position, conditionality  agreements  that
mlandate  a reduction in distortionary  taxation  will also require that some portion of lost
34revenues be made up by cuts in politically-motivated  transfers.  Policy conditionality  is
difficult to enforce, however, and even when perfectly  enforceable  is subject  to the
problem of aid dependency.
--  To avoid aid dependency,  donors  must focus on conditionality  that shifts the "no-aid"
point. This provides an interpretation  of current donor efforts in the area of
democratization  and institutional  development.  The shift from policy to "institutional"
conditionality  reflects an attempt  by Africa's donors  tD re-cast the aid relationship  from
one that at best secures  temporary  policy changes  in perpetuity  to one that permanently
alters institutions  in favor of sustained  growth  and development.
The last observation  brings us back to the issues  that motivated  this paper. In the end, a
diagnosis  that attributes  aid ineffectiveness  and low growth to institutional  failures raises more
questions about the appropriate  design  of aid conditionality  than it answers. Analytical  models
that treat the political  economy  as given (as byf and G in our case) should  prove useful  in
exploring the diagnosis  and posing the relevant  questions;  but a more complete  understanding
of aid effectiveness  requires  that the political  economy  be endogenized.  This is an extremely
important  area for empirical  and analytical  research.
35Appendix  1: Self-insurance,  growth  and taxation
In this Appendix  we use a stylized  model  to show  that the self-insurance  mechanisms  studied  at
the mricroeconomic  level by Paxson  (1990), Morduch  (1994,1995),  and others can affect the
aggregate  growth rate. The model  is extremely  simple; it combines  a resource-allocation
decisilon  by risk-averse  firms with an economy-wide  intertemporal  spillover  mechanism.  There
is no claim to generality  here; the aim is instead  to suggest  that the mechanisms  at work are
potentially  important  enough to warrant  further  study.
Private  income  risk and aggregate growth
We use an overlapping-generations  model  in which  risk-averse  producers (e.g., peasant
households)  live for two periods. In the first period of life, household  j divides  its labor time
between a safe, low-yielding  project (or crop)  and a risky, high-yielding  project. All income
arrives in the second  period and is consumed  then; there is no consumption  in the first period.
The aLverage  product of labor is A  > 0 for the safe crop and A  (I +x 1) for the risky crop, where  x
is a random  variable with that has positive  expected  value  but can be negative  with strictly
positive  probability. These restrictions  guarantee  that the household  will typically  find an
interior solution  in which it spends  some  time on each crop.
Defining a as the fraction  of labor time allocated  to the risky project, the household's
second-period  income is given by yj = (1  +ax>)A.  With a unit of labor time to allocate, the
house-hold  solves the problem
(A  1)  Max  EU(yt) =  EUI(l +  ax?4],
{a)
where the utility function U is increasing  and concave  in income. This problem has identical
structure  to the standard  portfolio  problem  in which  the investor  maximizes  the expected utility
of end-of-period  wealth (e.g., Ingersoll  (1987)). Letting  a* be the household's  optimal share
of labor allocated  to the risky project, we have  the first-order  condition
(A2)  E(U'ya)  = (I  - t)xE(U  x)  =  0,
where Ya  is the partial derivative  of y with respect  to a. Letting  w be a parameter that induces  a
mean-preserving  spread  on the distribution  of xj,  (A2) can be solved  for the optimal  supply of
labor to the risky project:
(A3)  a  = a '(A,w).
36An increase  in w makes the risky crop riskier, reducing  the fraction  of labor allocated to it. A
rise in A is the equivalent  of an increase  in wealth  in thie  standard  portfolio  problem; it
increases  (decreases)  time allocated  to the risky crop provided  that relative risk aversion is
increasing  (decreasing).
We move to the aggregate  level by assuming:  (i) that the household-level  shocks  x1 are
independently  and identically  distributed;  (ii) that productivity  spillovers  are proportional to
lagged output per household;  and (iii) that households  have constant  relative risk aversion. The
first of these assumptions  implies that uncertainty  washes  out in the aggregate; the second
implies that the "portfolio  share" a is independent  of core labor productivity  A. Under these
assumptions,  aggregate  output Y,  is the nonstochastic  quantity
(A4)  Y, =  [  a I(w)]AV,
where u =  E(x)  >  0 is the expected  value of xj and N is the (large)  number of households.  In
general, of course, shocks  to weather  or world agricultural  prices will induce a correlation
between  the Xj'S  across households,  making  aggregate  ircome a random  variable. This would
convert  our model  into a stochastic  growth  model  but would  not otherwise  change  anything  of
substance.  We are assuming  that private insurance  and credit markets  are unavailable  even to
handle idiosyncratic  risk, for reasons  (not modeled  here) like moral hazard  and legal
restrictions  on the offering  of labor as collateral.
To introduce  productivity  spillovers  that are proportional  to lagged  output per household,
we use A, to denote core productivity  for households  born in period t-1:
(A5)  At  = b  - ,  b >  O. (AS)  ~~~~~N
Combining  (A5) and (A4), we can solve  for the growth  rate of aggregate  output, which is
given by
(A6)  g  =  [I  + a  i(w)p]b  - 1.
The main results are now obvious:
Result 1.  A mean-preserving  spread  in the yield of the high-yielding  project lowers the
aggregate  growth rate.
Proof:  By (A2), a rise in w causes risk-averse  households  to reduce the time allocated to
the high-yield  project. By (A6), this reduces  the growth  rate.
37Result  2. The  private market generates  too little risk-taking.
Proof:  Since all risk is idiosyncratic,  the social  optimum  occurs where labor is devoted
entirely to the project with higher expected  yield: a = 1. The pzivate  market
generates too little risk-taking  in the absence  of mechanisms  to insure idiosyncratic
risk (we assume an interior solution  here).
Taxation  and growth with self-insurance
Uncertainty  about tax rates, which  presumably  is at least  as uninsurable  for domestic  residents
as uncertainty  about pre-tax returns, may  affect growth  through  the self-insurance  mechanisms
studied  above. To make this point obvious  assume  that  xj = p in the model  above, so that  the
high-yielding  project is safe. In the absence  of taxation, the higher-yielding  project dominates
the lower-yielding  one (recall that 1  +,u >  1) and households  allocate  labor only to the
high-yielding  project. The private market therefore  generates  the socially  optimal  allocation.
Suppose, however, that the government  levies  a proportional  tax on the high-yielding  project
(the low-yielding  activity  can be thought  of as a tax shelter), and that the tax rate is stochastic
from the perspective  of the individual  household.  The stochastic  tax can easily induce the
risk-averse  household  to diversify  away  from the socially  higher-yielding  project, with the
result of a fall in aggregate  growth.
The effect of stochastic  tax rates on portfolio  allocation  was studied  by Ekern (1971)  and
Hazoine  (1975) but has received  very little attention  since then. The discussion  here suggests
that this is an interesting  avenue  for further  work.
38Appendix  2: Proof of Proposition  1
Define  L = tg(K,*) as revenue from the distortionary  itax.  The first-order conditions  for
problem (3) are then
(4.1)  VI + AL, =  O
(4.2)  (V/f7+  c =  O,
where A and c are the lagrange  multipliers  associated  with (3.1) and (3.2), and where  L,
denotes  the derivative  of L with respect  to t, which  is the slope  of the Laffer curve (L, = tg, +
g). Note that there should  also be a constraint  requiring  t 2 0, but as long as G > A, this
constraint  is never binding.
To verify our earlier graphical  analysis, note that equations  (4.1) and (4.2) imply
(5)  -f(V/V5 =  L, + C (f/VZ)LV
The left-hand  side of (5) is the slope  of an indifference  curve. If the nonnegativity  constraint
on transfers  is not binding  (so that Tis positive  and c =- ), the right-hand  side of (5) is the
slope  of the Laffer curve and the optimum  takes  place at a point of tangency,  as discussed  in
the text. It is straightforward  to verify that the second-order  condition  holds for the production
function  g(KH)  =  KHf, 0 < a <  1, for a 2  1/2 (the latter condition  is sufficient  but not
necessary).
We now show  thatf  = I implies c > 0, so that transfers  are zero for a fully representative
government.  By the envelope  theorem, V,  = -fPU 2g(K,1)  and V.  =  pU 2. Letting q be the
elasticity  of the output function (e  = -tg'(t)/g(t) > 0), we can use (4.1) and (4.2) to write
(6)  2 =  1/61-a)  =  I/f  + c/8U2
The shadow  price A is nonnegative,  so we know that at an optimum, 0 <  v s1.  It follows
that A >  1. But this in turn implies that iff  =1, we must have c > 0.
To show that (3.2) remains  binding  for "sufficiently"  representative  governments,  simply
note that with T = 0, the tax rate is tied down  by the Laffer  curve (the optimal t solves  t =
(G-A)/g(t)).  But since q is a function  only of t, this ties down the value of v and therefore  of A
in (6). The cutoff value off is therefore  given  by (6) with c = 0:
(7)  f  =  (I-  <  1.
This establishes  Proposition  1.
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